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MISTAKING MARRIAGE FOR SOCIAL POLICY 
Vivian Hamilton 1 
This Article examines the role of marriage in society, focusing 
on the state's use of marriage as a proxy for desirable outcomes 
in social policy. Its analytical point of departure is the 
normative vision of modern marriage embraced by many of its 
proponents. From there, the idealized marriage is analyzed, not 
as a monolithic, opaque institution, but as one whose functional 
components may be identified and examined. The Article 
identifies the following as the primary functions of the normative 
marital family: expression; companionship; sex/procreation; 
caretaking; and economic support or redistribution. Analyzing 
the roles in society of each of these functions, it concludes that: 
(1) the expressive and companionate functions of marriage 
provide no societal benefit sufficient to justify state interference 
in those functions; (2) its purely sexual and procreative functions 
merit privacy and should, in all respects, be treated no 
differently than nonmarital sex and procreation; but (3) its 
caretaking and economic support functions benefit society 
significantly. Indeed, here the state's interest is at its apex. 
Accordingly, direct support of these two closely related 
functions, rather than the crude proxy of marriage in its entirety, 
should be the focus of state social policy in this area. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
We are at a crossroads. The Supreme Court's decision in Lawrence 
v. Texas2 has cast further doubt on the already-questioned Defense of 
Director, Women & the Law Clinic, American University Washington College of 
Law. For their generous and insightful comments on earlier drafts, I thank Ann 
Shalleck, Nancy Polikoff, Elizabeth Bruch, Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, John 
Frankenhoff, Martha Fineman and participants in the Cornell Feminist Legal Theory 
Workshop held at the University of Wisconsin. I am grateful to Pamela Bridgewater and 
Darren Hutchinson for supporting my work. I also thank Traci Hale, Danielle Hayot, 
Teresa Rogers, and Andrew Stawar for their capable research assistance. 
2 123 S.Ct. 2472 (2003). In Lawrence v. Texas, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a 
Texas statute making it a crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in certain 
308 Virginia Journal of Social Policy & the Law (Vol. 11:3 
Marriage Act ("DOMA"),3 as well as the laws of every state excluding 
same-sex couples from marrying. Debate about a possible constitutional 
amendment to ban gay marriage has led to President Bush throwing his 
support behind the idea.4 The argument, of course, rages on. On one 
side, there are impassioned defenses of marriage as it currently exists in 
the U.S.; on the other, equally impassioned attacks on the institution as 
traditionally conceived. Yet the history and laws of the United States 
reflect a national commitment to heterosexual monogamy.5 And this 
commitment is about more than just favoring one type of marriage over 
alternative forms. Marriage itself is seen as a tool to ensure the well-
being of families and children, and federal and state family policies 
continue to rely heavily on it to do so.6 That social policy is expressed 
intimate sexual conduct was unconstitutional as applied to adult males who had engaged 
in consensual acts of sodomy in the privacy of the home. Overruling Bowers v. 
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (holding that the U.S. Constitution provides no 
fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy), the Court acknowledged that 
individual decisions concerning the intimacies of physical relationships are a form of 
liberty, and hence, the Texas statute impinged on the exercise of liberty interests 
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 123 S.Ct. at 2484. 
In its rationale, the Court cited an "emerging awareness" in the Nation's laws and 
traditions over the past half century that liberty gives substantial protection to adult 
persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex. /d. at 
2480. 
3 1 U.S.C.A. § 7 (2004). DOMA defines marriage for purposes of federal law to 
include "only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife" and 
defines "spouse" as "only a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife." It 
seeks to relieve states of the obligation to recognize same-sex marriages contracted in 
any other state. Even before the Supreme Court's decision in Lawrence, the Act's 
constitutionality was the subject of vigorous debate. For articles attacking the 
constitutionality of the Act, see, e.g., James M. Donovan, DOMA: An Unconstitutional 
Establishment of Fundamentalist Christianity, 4 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 335 (1997); 
Andrew Koppelman, Dumb and DOMA: Why the Defense of Marriage Act Is 
Unconstitutional, 83 IOWA L. REv. I (1997); Scott Ruskay-Kidd, The Defense of 
Marriage Act and the Overextension of Congressional Authority, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 
1435 (1997). For articles defending the Act, see, e.g. David Orgon Coolidge & William 
C. Duncan, Reaffirming Marriage: A Presidential Priority, 24 HARv. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 
623 (200 1 ); Daniel Crane, The Original Understanding of the "Effects Clause" of 
Article IV. Section 1, and Implications for the Defense of Marriage Act, 6 GEO. MASON 
L. REv. 307 (1998); Ralph U. Whitten, The Original Understanding of the Full Faith 
and Credit Clause and the Defense of Marriage Act, 32 CREIGHTON L. REv. 255 (1998). 
4 President George W. Bush, Announcement in the White House Roosevelt Room 
~Feb. 24, 2004) (transcribed by FDCH E-Media). 
See generally MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY 
IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 64-152 (1985). See also June Carbone, Morality, 
Public Policy and the Family: The Role of Marriage and the Public/Private Divide, 36 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 267, 269-71 (1996). 6 See, e.g., Carbone, supra note 5, at 269-70: 
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through legislation.? Marriage is proposed and accepted (so to speak) by 
lawmakers as a proxy for socially desirable outcomes. The federal 
The first question is whether the United States has, or, indeed, has ever 
had a family policy as such ... [W]hen the public and private spheres 
are considered together, a fairly clear family policy does emerge, at 
least in hindsight. U.S. law, policy, and social mores have long focused 
on an overwhelming, some would argue exclusive, emphasis on 
traditional marriage as the only legitimate locus of childrearing. Within 
this system, the state has regulated marriage, divorce, the status of 
children, and the fmancial consequences of these relationships, but state 
responsibility for children's well-being has been largely discharged with 
the creation and maintenance of the marital union. 
/d. at 269 (internal citations omitted). See also Libby S. Adler, Federalism and Family, 
8 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 197, 197-99 (1999) ("Under our federalist system, the axiom 
has it, family law resides within the province of the states . .. As a factual matter, 
however, the federal government exerts tremendous power over family."). 
1 See infra notes 187-194 and accompanying text for a discussion of the myriad 
benefits that accompany married status. The federal income tax system, however, is one 
of the few places where marriage is only inconsistently rewarded. William Galston notes 
that currently, joint returns for married couples combine with progressive marginal rates 
to reduce the income tax liability of some married couples but increase the tax liability of 
others. William Galston, Observations on Some Proposals to Help Parents: A 
Progressive Perspective, in TAKING PARENTING PUBLIC: THE CASE FOR A NEW SOCIAL 
MOVEMENT 155, 162 (Hewlett, Rankin, & West, eds., 2002). Nonetheless, slightly more 
couples receive a marriage bonus than pay a marriage penalty. See CoNGRESSIONAL 
BUDGET OFFICE, FOR BEITER OR WORSE: MARRIAGE AND THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 1 
(1997). The Congressional Budget Office study found that in 1996, 25 million married 
couples had their income tax liabilities reduced by $33 billion, while more than 21 
million couples paid $29 billion more in federal income tax than they would if they were 
unmarried. !d. But as the proportion of two-earner couples with comparable incomes 
increases, so too will the proportion of married couples paying a marriage penalty. See 
Lawrence Zelenak, Doing Something About Marriage Penalties: A Guide for the 
Perplexed, 54 TAX L. REv. 1, 6-7 (2000). 
The joint return system treats married couples as single economic units, combining their 
income in the joint return. But because the joint return rate schedule consists of brackets 
that are wider than the brackets for single taxpayers but less than twice as wide, some 
couples receive marriages bonuses while others pay marriage penalties. See Lawrence 
Zelenak, Marriage and the Income Tax, 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 339, 340-42 (1994). Two-
earner couples with comparable incomes suffer a marriage penalty because they are 
pushed into tax brackets higher than they would be in if they were filing separately. 
Married workers with nonearning spouses (or spouses with significantly lower earnings), 
on the other hand, receive a marriage bonus and have lower tax liability than single, 
equal earning workers. The current system thus arguably creates an incentive for 
couples to conform to the single- or primary-earner family model. See EDWARD J. 
MCCAFFERY, TAXING WOMEN 11-28 {1997); Zelenak, Marriage and the Income Tax, 
supra at 343. For a concise and accessible explanation of the marriage "penalty" and 
"bonus", see Richard B. Malamud, Allocation of the Joint Return Marriage Penalty and 
Bonus, 15 VA. TAX REV. 489,491-93 (1996). 
Some argue that the penalty that affects some couples dissuades couples from marrying. 
See, e.g., id. at 493; MICHAELl. GRAETZ, THE DECLINE (AND FALL?) OF THE INCOME TAX 
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government explicitly embraced marriage as a facet of antipoverty 
policy when it enacted the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 ("PRWORA"). PRWORA, 
among other things, designates public monies to encourage poor women 
to marry.8 That same year, congressional enactment of DOMA allowed 
for the policing of public morality with respect to marriage by permitting 
states to refuse to give legal effect to same-sex marriages recognized by 
other states. 9 
This is clearly a time of legislative and cultural ferment on the issue 
of marriage and the state's use of it as a tool of social policy, so it is 
appropriate to evaluate both. In doing so, I operate from the premise 
that bare public morality ought not be the sole justification for public 
policy or state action. Public morality, without more, is not necessarily 
connected to the public welfare. Peter Cicchino, echoing and 
elaborating on the work of John Stuart Mill, argues that the state should 
not prohibit private conduct that does not injure third parties solely 
29-40 ( 1997). But the existence of a marriage penalty for some couples seems to have 
had little or no effect on the marriage rate. See, e.g., David L. Sjoquist & Mary Beth 
Walker, The Marriage Tax and the Rate and Timing of Marriage, 48 NAT'L TAX J. 547 
(1995) (reporting no effect of the marriage penalty on female marriage rates); James Aim 
& Leslie A. Whittington, Does the Income Tax Affect Marital Decisions? 48 NAT'L TAX 
J. 565 (1995) (reporting that the marriage penalty has an impact, albeit a small one, on 
marriage rates). The likely reason is that other economic, legal, and social benefits of 
marriage far outweigh the costs imposed by an income tax penalty. See, e.g., Robert S. 
Mcintyre & Michael J. Mcintyre, Fixing the "Marriage Penalty" Problem, 33 VAL. U.L. 
REv. 907, 912 (1999). Mcintyre & Mcintyre surmise that "[t]he collateral effects of 
marriage and divorce apparently are sufficiently important to married couples that they 
are unwilling to change their marital status simply to gain . . . tax benefits". !d. 
8 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 601-617 (2004); llO Stat. 2105, 2113-34 (1996). The Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 replaced the earlier 
public assistance program, Aid to Families With Dependent Children, Social Security 
Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-271, § 401, 49 Stat. 620, 627 (1935); Social Security 
Amendments of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-880, § 312, 70 Stat. 807, 848-49 (1956); Public 
Welfare Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-543, § I 04, 76 Stat. 172, 185-86 (1962); 
Social Security Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-248, § 241, 81 Stat. 821, 916 
(1968), with the new Temporary Assistance to Needy Families ("TANF"). PRWORA 
also revised many other federal initiatives by making changes to programs that included 
food stamps, child support, aid for disabled children, and child care. !d. One of the 
stated purposes of the legislation is "to end dependency of needy parents on government 
benefits by promoting job preparation, work and marriage." Id. at§ 60l(a)(2). The Act 
funds state programs designed to encourage marriage and two-parent families, and is so 
broadly worded that the programs need not be targeted exclusively to needy families, but 
can instead aim to reach non-needy families as well. 
9 1 U.S.C.A. § 7. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
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because that conduct violates majoritarian morality.IO I extend that 
argument. Not only should the state refrain from prohibiting such 
conduct, but it also should avoid promoting certain sorts of private 
conduct based largely on moral considerations-particularly, conduct 
that goes to the core of self-definition and identity. Within this core 
reside the proper nature and structure of intimate relationships between 
adults. State involvement in these areas distorts preferences; the more 
''private" the area, the more the state should be aware of and restrain-or 
entirely abstain from using-its coercive power. 
This Article explores the role of marriage and the marital family in 
society by dismantling the normative marital relationship11 into its 
functional parts and examining each separately. When government 
promotes marriage through legislation, it promotes all that the institution 
entails, suggesting that marriage itself promotes the public welfare. I 
argue that the institution of marriage is not monolithic; instead, the 
normative marital relationship can be viewed as a composite whose 
primary functions may be identified and systematically analyzed. 
Litigants and academics have employed functional approaches to the 
family in order to obtain for alternative families benefits usually 
reserved for marital families. A functional approach typically questions 
whether an unconventional relationship shares the essential 
characteristics of a traditionally accepted relationship; if so, the 
10 See Peter M. Cicchino, Reason and the Rule of Law: Should Bare Assertions of 
"Public Morality" QualifY as Legitimate Government Interests for the Purposes of 
Equal Protection Review? 87 GEO. L.J. 139 (1998). Cicchino focuses on governmental 
laws that discriminate against people on the basis of their sexual orientation. His 
analysis is grounded in constitutional equal protection jurisprudence, and he argues that 
"a bare assertion of public morality provides no 'rational basis' for a law because such 
assertions, unsupported by any observable connection to the public welfare, are not 
themselves rational." Id. at 142. See also. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 2480 
(2003), quoting Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 
(1992) ("The issue is whether the majority may use the power of the State to enforce [the 
view that homosexuality is wrong] on the whole society through operation of the 
criminal law. 'Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own 
moral code."'); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (J. Stevens, dissenting) 
("[T]he fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular 
practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the 
practice; neither history nor tradition could save a law prohibiting miscegenation from 
constitutional attack."); JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 80-81 (David Bromnich & 
George Kateb eds., 2003). 
11 By this, I mean the idealized vision of the marital family espoused by many of its 
proponents. See infra notes 17-30 and accompanying text. 
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argument goes, the unconventional relationship should receive 
equivalent benefits or privileges. 12 This Article, however, will use this 
approach differently. Just as it is useful in the contexts of litigation and 
academia to unbundle marriage, this unbundling could also be an apt 
tool in the creation of policy and legislation. I suggest that makers of 
social policy use the diffracting lens of a functional approach to examine 
marriage and the marital family to disaggregate and then better 
understand its various components before adopting marriage as a 
solution to social ills. 
Part II of this Article briefly reviews several prominent theories of 
modem marriage. 13 First, it describes what is often referred to as the 
"traditional" family14-the two-parent household where the partners' 
roles complement each other. The husband focuses on his career and 
providing income to the household, the wife subordinates her career (or 
abandons the workplace altogether) to become the family's primary 
caretaker and otherwise meet the household's needs. Second, it 
discusses the liberal feminist vision of the 'egalitarian' family-where 
the husband and wife share income earning, childrearing, and household 
chores. This part concludes by discussing a feminist critique, led by 
Martha Fineman, of the modern and liberal feminist visions of the 
egalitarian family. That critique takes the view that it is not enough to 
examine inequality within the family. Instead, Fineman urges 
reexamination of the centrality in society of the nuclear family itself. 
Part III attempts the sort of reexamination that Fineman favors by 
exploring the marital family's dominant role in society. It proposes a 
diffracting functional approach as a framework through which a 
12 Note, Looking for a Family Resemblance: The Limits of the Functional Approach to 
the Legal Definition of Family, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 1640, 1646-47 (1991). Several 
commentators have identified problems with adopting an approach that uses the 
'traditional' family as a reference point; I discuss this and other limitations of the 
functional approach in Part II.A. See infra notes 17-30 and accompanying text. 
13 See infra notes 17-46 and accompanying text. 
14 Historians have noted that the "popular image of what families were supposed to be 
like (is] by no means a correct recollection of any actual 'traditional' family." JUDITH 
STACEY, IN THE NAME OF THE FAMILY: RETHINKlNG FAMILY VALUES IN THE POSTMODERN 
AGE 6 (1996) (internal citations omitted). They and others who write about the family 
thus use "the concept of the modern family to designate a family form that most 
Americans now consider to be traditional ... [T]he term postmodern family instead .. . 
signal[s] the contested, ambivalent, and undecided character of our contemporary family 
cultures." /d. at 6-7 (emphasis added). For accuracy, I will use the term "modern 
family" when discussing that family form. For clarity, I will occasionally call it the "so-
called traditional family". 
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reexamination of marriage and the marital family's role in society should 
occur. 15 First, the more familiar functional form of analysis is discussed. 
This familiar form presumes that social regulation of the family arises 
from the state's interest in the various functions the family performs in 
society. Indeed, those who have relied on this approach have urged that 
nontraditional intimate groupings be recognized as "families" when they 
perform functions analogous to those of the so-called traditional family. 
Part III then proceeds to describe a revised functional theory that 
dissects the functions performed by normative marriage-that idealized 
vision of matrimony imagined by its proponents, the most prominent of 
whom may be Nobel laureate economist Gary Becker.16 Through the 
diffracting lens of this revised functional approach, normative marriage 
is seen to perform the following primary societal tasks: expression, 
companionship, sex and procreation, caretaking, and economic 
support/redistribution. An examination of state marital activism ought 
not focus solely on marriage as an imagined monolith, but instead on 
this more complicated, unbundled view of the institution as composed of 
numerous functional elements that contribute in multiple ways to its 
ultimate operation. 
I then analyze each of marriage's functions separately. The analyses 
seek to reconcile a rights-based approach that recognizes individuals' 
privacy, autonomy, and/or dependency, with an overarching approach to 
social policy that acknowledges a greater societal interest in and 
responsibility for ensuring the social welfare. 
I conclude that its expressive and companionate functions do not 
benefit society sufficiently to justify state involvement. The purely 
sexual/procreative function, like the sexual and procreative decisions of 
unmarried adults, merits privacy. State involvement in these familial 
functions may unnecessarily dictate the content of individuals' 
expression, distort their freedom to choose the nature of their intimate 
associations and personal commitments, and excessively involve the 
state in private sexual and procreative decisions. 
On the other hand, two of marriage's functions--dependent 
caretaking and economic support and redistribution-provide 
tremendous societal benefit. Indeed, the state's interest in and 
15 See infra notes 54-250 and accompanying text. 
16 See infra notes 17-30 and accompanying text. 
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responsibility for ensuring the public welfare not only merit state 
support of these functions, they require it. But caregiving and economic 
support benefit society whether performed within or outside of the 
marital relationship. Government should therefore refrain from 
promoting marriage and instead enact better-targeted and more efficient 
policies to directly support these important societal functions. 
II. THEORIES OF MODERN AND POSTMODERN MARRIAGE17 
A. The Modern Family 
As mentioned above, the classic theory of the modem family has 
been expressed most prominently by economist Gary Becker. Although 
he initially published A Treatise on the Family more than twenty years 
ago, 18 his vision of the specialized two-parent family continues to be 
both cited explicitly and relied upon implicitly by modem proponents of 
this family structure. 19 In his treatise, Becker argues that the division of 
labor by gender within marriage is efficient and thus properly the central 
feature of family life. 20 He posits a series of theorems to describe the 
two types of activity-market work and household production-that 
largely make up family life. One theorem provides that, "[i]f all 
members of an efficient household have different comparative 
advantages, no more than one member would allocate time to both the 
market and the household sectors."21 Another of his theorems states that 
"[i]f commodity production functions have constant or increasing returns 
to scale, all members of efficient households would specialize completely 
in the market or household sectors and would invest only in market or 
household capital."22 
17 See STACEY, supra note 14, at 10, for a definition and discussion of "modem" and 
"iostmodern" families. 
I GARY BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY (1981). 
19 See, e.g., Steven L. Nock, Why Not Marriage?, 9 VA. J. Soc. PoL'Y & L. 273, 276 
& n.8 (2001) (citing to Becker's description of"marital-specific capital"). Other family 
theorists, who do not necessarily subscribe to Becker's views, regularly cite his treatise 
as articulating a type of analysis since used to prescribe a 'traditional' family code. See, 
e.g., JUNE CARBONE, FROM PARTNERS TO PARENTS: THE SECOND REVOLUTION IN FAMILY 
LAw 3-9, 16-19, 30-34 (2000) (portraying Becker's economic theory of the family as 
rzrresentative of defenses of the specialized two-parent family). 
2 BECKER, supra note 18, at 14-37. 
21 !d. at 17. 
22 /d. at 19 (emphasis added). 
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Becker argues that a division of labor would still be efficient even 
between "intrinsically identical" spouses.23 However, he suggests that 
women have a "comparative advantage" when it comes to both 
childbearing and childrearing. Because even small differences along 
gender lines result in a rational gendered division of labor, women 
should "specialize" in household activities while men "specialize" in the 
market.24 Becker concludes that this division of labor most benefits 
families, suggesting that wives either devote their time entirely to 
caretaking and homemaking, or at least limit their workforce 
participation so that they are able to take on the lion's share of 
caretaking and household responsibilities.25 
Modem family theory thus views the division of labor by gender as 
the central advantage of the family, and codependence between husband 
and wife (their "complementarity," as opposed to equality) as a 
necessary corollary:26 
23 GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON TIIE FAMILY 30-37 (1981). 
[EJven if a husband and wife are intrinsically identical, they gain from a 
division of labor between market and household activities ... The gain 
comes from increasing returns to investments in sector-specific human 
capital that raise productivity mainly in either the market or the nonmarket 
sectors. Therefore, even small differences between men and women-
presumably related at lease partially to the advantages of women in the 
birth and rearing of children-would cause a division of labor by gender, 
with wives more specialized to household activities and husbands more 
specialized to other work." 
!d. at 3-4. See also RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 155-58 
~1992). 
4 BECKER, supra note 23, at 4. 
25 BECKER, supra note 18, at 21-23. The idealization of mothers as the "natural" 
primary caretaker continues. Psychologist Brenda Hunter is among many professionals 
who urge women to abandon paid market work in order to stay home with their children 
and fulfill their womanhood. See generally BRENDA HUNTER, THE POWER OF MOTHER 
LOVE (1998). 26 Other theorists who endorse role specialization as the central feature of marriage 
nonetheless acknowledge that such specialization can lead to opportunistic behavior. 
Investments made by each partner are not symmetrical. Investment in market capital is 
portable; investment in caretaking and the household is not-it is "marriage specific". 
See Lloyd Cohen, Divorce and Quasi Rents: Or, I Gave Him the Best Years of My Life, 
in 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 267 (1987). Cohen argues that men benefit from marriage the most 
during the childrearing years that tend to come early in the relationship. During that 
period in their lives, wives' perfonning the bulk of the childrearing and household tasks 
enables their husbands to concentrate their efforts on developing their careers. Women 
enjoy the greatest benefits once their children are older and their husbands' earning 
capacity has reached its peak. !d. at 287. 
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Specialization of tasks, such as the division of labor between men 
and women, implies a dependence on others for certain tasks. 
Women have traditionally relied on men for provision of food, 
shelter, and protection, and men have traditionally relied on women 
for the bearing and rearing of children and the maintenance of the 
home. Consequently, both men and women have been made better 
off by a 'marriage ' . .. 27 
Other proponents of the modem family envision a modified version 
of the modem nuclear family-still characterized by a market/household 
division of labor, but somewhat less circumscribed by the biologism of 
Becker's analysis. David Popenoe, for example, envisions a family in 
many ways indistinguishable from Becker' s "efficient" family, at least 
during the childrearing years. 28 In Popenoe's ideal world, mothers 
would care for children full-time in their infancy. Once children have 
reached twelve to eighteen months of age, mothers could resume 
working part-time, but preferably not return to full-time work until their 
children have reached their teen years. Popenoe does suggest that 
fathers could stay home part-time to care for non-infant children while 
mothers resume full-time work; but during infancy, he claims that 
children cared for by their mothers "appear to have distinct advantages 
over those reared apart from their mothers."29 This modified vision of 
the modem marital family acknowledges both the importance "for 
women [of being] able to achieve the economic, social, and psychic 
When a marriage breaks down, the spouse who has specialized in the domestic aspects of 
the marriage will suffer a disproportionate loss. Ira Ellman agrees that specialization is a 
rational choice for married couples with different earning capacities. He argues that 
legal rules should encourage participation in such rational sharing by ensuring that a 
spouse who sacrifices her own earning capacity in the marketplace to increase the 
income and efficiency of the marital unit as a whole is not penalized when the marriage 
ends. Ira Ellman, The Theory of Alimony, 77 CAL. L. REv. I, 46-51 (1989). 
Accordingly, Ellman proposes that states adopt systems of alimony based on 
compensating divorcing spouses for marriage-related economic losses as an attempt to 
"reallocate the post-divorce financial consequences of marriage in order to prevent 
distorting incentives" from affecting individuals' choices during a marriage. !d. at 50. 
27 BECKER, supra note 18, at27 (emphasis added). 
28 David Popenoe, Modern Marriage: Revising the Cultural Script, in PROMISES TO 
KEEP: DECLINE AND RENEWAL Of MARRIAGE IN AMERJCA 247, 262-65 (David Popenoe, 
eta/., eds., 1996). 
29 !d. at 264. 
2004] Mistaking Marriage for Social Policy 317 
rewards of the workplace"30 and the reality that economic necessity may 
require that both husband and wife work.31 
B. Feminist Critiques and Postmodern Marriage 
Feminists have voiced multiple objections to this modem vision of 
family, critiquing both the marital relationship itself and inequities 
caused by the privileging of the marital family in society. Feminists 
have criticized marriage as it has actually been experienced by many 
couples and have illustrated the many ways in which the institution 
fails.32 Indeed, the liberal feminist view, characterized by the work of 
Susan Moller Okin, criticizes the very specialization that Becker praises. 
Okin draws on studies of power within families that demonstrate that 
"the amount of money a person earns-in comparison with a partner's 
income--establishes relative power."33 Women's historic economic 
vulnerability reinforces and perpetuates the historically hierarchical 
social arrangement within marriage. In this arrangement, husbands are 
heads of household, and wives owe them domestic and sexual services 
and obedience. 34 The marital family has thus contributed to social and 
economic marginalization of women and perpetuated male dominance 
and patriarchy.35 Okin instead envisions the egalitarian family as the 
solution to the problem of women's subordination and economic 
vulnerability. Such a family would "encourage and facilitate the equal 
sharing by men and women of paid and unpaid work, of productive and 
reproductive labor."36 
Yet unlike Okin and the liberal feminists, other feminist thinkers 
believe that the gendered nature of the nuclear marital family will be 
resistant to all but the most radical transformations. Like the liberal 
30 /d. at 262. See also Vicki Schultz, Life's Work, I 00 COLUM. L. REv. 1881 (2000). 
31 Popenoe, supra note 28 at 264. 32 See, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL 
FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 145-66 ( 1995); Nancy D. Po1ikoff, 
We Will Get What We Ask For: Why Legalizing Gay and Lesbian Marriage Will Not 
''Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in Every Marriage, " 79 VA. L. REv. 1535, 
1535-41 (1993); JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK 
CONFLICT AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT l-9 (2000). 33 SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER AND THE FAMILY 157-59 (1989). See also 
Carolyn J. Frantz & Hanoch Dagan, Properties of Marriage, I 04 CoLUM. L. REv. 75 
(2004); M. Rivka Po1atnick, Why Men Don't Rear Children: A Power Analysis, in 
MOTHERING: ESSAYS IN FEMINIST THEORY 21, 24-28 (Joyce Trebilcot ed., 1983). 
34 See NANCY F. COTI, PuBLIC Vows 12 (2000). 
35 OKIN, supra note 33, at 171. 
36 /d. 
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feminists, they reject the classic conception of the modem marital family 
form. But this group, led by Martha Fineman, also criticizes the ideal of 
the egalitarian family as fundamentally insufficient to overcome the 
gendered and unequal nature of the marital family. 37 Fineman 
acknowledges that attaining equality in the marketplace, one of the goals 
of the egalitarian couple, potentially leaves the family without available 
caretakers. 38 "Shared" caretaking between parents has remained 
illusory-whether or not both partners work, women perform the 
majority of domestic work. 39 Furthermore, when couples must 
inevitably compromise one partner's career to provide caretaking, both 
economic considerations and social conditioning drive the choice. 
Unless they are able to hire others to perform caretaking functions, it is 
women who typically give up their aspirations of market equality and 
either abandon the marketplace or limit their market activities to enable 
them to become primary caretakers. These dilemmas underscore the 
gendered core of the modem family.40 
Fineman argues that so long as society allocates the responsibility 
for caretaking solely to the nuclear family, women's inequality will 
continue. She further asserts that society has an interest in providing for 
its dependents and that mothering41 should be recognized as a socially 
beneficial caretaking function. She recommends giving primacy and 
privacy to the mother-child relationship, as opposed to the husband-wife 
relationship. This would include de-privileging the marital family, 
discontinuing the subsidies it receives, and abolishing legal recognition 
of marriage altogether. In its place, the mother-child dyad should be 
considered the central family relationship, entitled to state support and 
subsidy.42 
37 FINEMAN, supra note 32, at 27, 70-89, 157-66. 
38 Id. at 164-66. 
39 /d. 
40 /d. 
41 Fineman views "mothering" as a gendered activity different in quality from 
"fathering". She argues that: 
[t]he Mother/Child metaphor represents a specific practice of social and 
emotional responsibility ... [M]en can and should be Mothers. In fact, if 
men are interested in acquiring legal rights of access to children (or other 
dependents), I argue they must be Mothers in the stereotypical nurturing 
sense of that term-that is, engaged in caretaking. 
FINEMAN, supra note 32, at 234-35 (emphasis in the original). 
42 FINEMAN, supra note 32, at 230-36. 
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Fineman criticizes feminist family theorists for limiting their focus 
to explorations of inequities and injustices within the family.43 She 
considers it a mistake to concentrate exclusively on the unequal 
relationships inside the family unit and instead urges feminists to "look 
to what work the idea of a marital family does in society, and the ways 
in which public and private institutions rely on that work getting 
done. "44 The work of feminist theorists, then, should include examining 
the institution of the family itself within a larger societal context.45 
The analysis of marriage and the marital family below attempts such 
an examination. Part III separates out the component functions of 
marriage, starting with an idealized vision of marriage derived from 
conceptions of the modern marital family discussed above. Parsing the 
marital family and analyzing its primary functions helps clarify how 
each of those functions relates to society and how (and whether) each 
furthers societal goals. 
C. A Functional Approach 
A functional approach to marital and family theory has been 
employed by family law scholars and practitioners in the recent past. 
That approach seeks first to identify the essential characteristics of or 
functions performed by the conventionally accepted relationship, i.e., the 
43 Martha A. Fineman, Why Marriage?, 9 VA. J. Soc. PoL'Y & L. 239, 252-53 (2001). 
For example, Katharine Bartlett has suggested that feminism' s principal contribution to 
family law "has been to open up that institution to critical scrutiny and question the 
justice of a legal regime that has permitted, even reinforced, the subordination of some 
family members to others." Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminism and Family Law, 33 FAM. 
L.Q. 475, 475 (1999). Fineman suggests that Bartlett's observations reflect feminist 
family law's too-limited focus. Feminists have indeed made gains by challenging 
traditional patriarchal family law and have helped in the attainment of formal gender 
equality. But feminism's efforts stopped short of challenging the very meaning of 
marriage and the marital family in the societal context. Fineman, supra at 252-53. 
44 Id. at 253. 
45 Roscoe Pound, for example, sought to have individual and societal interests, such as 
the family and marriage as social institutions, "compared on the same plane". See 
generally Roscoe Pound, A Survey of Social Interests, 57 HARV. L. REV. I , 2, 20-22 
(I 943). Pound believed the family and marriage to be so central to society's well-being 
that its preservation alone was an important societal interest. According to Pound, the 
societal interest comprised, "on the one hand a social interest in the maintenance of the 
family as a social institution and on the other hand a social interest in the protection of 
dependent persons, in securing to all individuals a moral and social life and in the rearing 
and training of sound and wetl-bred citizens for the future." Roscoe Pound, Individual 
Interests in Domestic Relations, 14 MICH. L. REv. 177, 182 ( 1916). A feminist critique, 
on the other hand, refuses to take as given the inherent superiority of the marital family 
form, or the inevitability of this societal role for the marital family. 
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nuclear marital family. It then inquires whether an alternative 
relationship or set of relationships shares those characteristics. If so, 
then the alternative relationship ought also to receive the benefits 
accorded the conventionally recognized relationship. The primary goal 
of this approach has been to gain inclusion of non-conventional family 
forms in the defmition of "family" so that they may receive benefits 
enjoyed by modem marital families.46 Yet although the functional 
approach continues to be argued by litigants and implemented in family 
cases including, for example, custody, visitation,47 and adoption,48 it has 
46 See, e.g., Paula Ettelbrick, Who Is a Parent?: The Need to Develop a Lesbian 
Conscious Family Law, 10 N .Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 513, 514-15 (1993); Nancy 
Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs 
of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 459, 
471-73 (1990); Mary Patricia Treuthart, Adopting a More Realistic Definition of 
"Family", 26 GONZ. L. REv. 91,92 (1990/1991); supra note 12 at 1641. 
See also Braschi v. Stahl Associates, 74 N.Y.2d 201 (1989). The New York Court of 
Appeals' decision in Braschi is an important manifestation of the functional view of the 
family in the courts. The question in the case was whether the same-sex partner of a 
deceased man could inherit a rent-controlled apartment after the death of his partner, 
whose name was on the lease. In order for him to do so, the couple had to be considered 
a "family" under New York's rent-control laws (under the governing law, a landlord 
could not evict either the surviving spouse or some other member of the deceased 
tenant's family who has been living with the tenant "in the housing accommodation as a 
primary residence who can prove emotional and financial commitment, and 
interdependence between such person and the tenant." Rent and Eviction Regulations-
New York City, 9 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS § 2204.6 (d) (3) (2003)). The Court 
found that the relationship between the two men properly constituted a family because 
they had lived together for more than ten years, shared social lives, domestic 
responsibilities, and financial obligations. It held that "the term family as used in 9 
NYCRR 2204.6 (d), should not be rigidly restricted to those people who have formalized 
their relationship", but should instead reflect "the reality of family life." Braschi, 74 
N.Y.2d at 211. The Court reasoned that a functional approach was justified since the 
policy rationales underlying the regulations were equally served by protecting committed 
cohabitants as they were by protecting marital families. The Court announced that "a 
more realistic, and certainly equally valid, view of a family includes two adult lifetime 
partners whose relationship is long term and characterized by an emotional and financial 
commitment and interdependence." !d. 
47 For example, sixteen states have reported cases granting custody or visitation to the 
same-sex (non-adoptive) partners or former partners of children's parents, thus 
acknowledging the existence of a bond analogous to that of a parent and child. See, e.g., 
Guardianship of Olivia J., 84 Cal. App. 4111 1146, 1159 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000); In re The 
Matter of Visitation with C.B.L., 723 N.E.2d 316, 321 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999); S.F. v. M.D .. , 
751 A.2d 9, 10 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000); E.N.O v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 889 
(Mass. 1999); McGuffin v. Overton, 542 N.W.2d 288, 291 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995); 
LaChapelle v. Mitten, 607 N.W.2d 151, 157 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000), cert. denied, 531 
U.S. lOll (2000); In re Matter of T.L.A.L., 1996 Mo. Cir. WL 393521 at *4; V.C. v. 
M.J.B., 725 A.2d 13, 22 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999), ajf'd, 748 A.2d 539 (N.J. 
2000)s, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 926 (2000); A.C. v. C.B., 829 P.2D 660, 666 (N.M. Ct. 
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since lost favor with legal scholars. These theorists have identified 
significant problems with relying on this theory to extend recognition to 
alternative families. 
Arguably the most significant drawback to using a functional theory 
to gain legal recognition of nontraditional families is that doing so 
implicitly concedes the marital nuclear family as the paradigmatic 
family form.49 The unmodified "family" is understood as describing a 
grouping that originates with and centers around a marital union. 50 
Nonmarital intimate relationships continue to be measured against that 
norm, and those relationships receive recognition only to the extent that 
they resemble and reference the marital nuclear family. 
App. 1992); J.C. v. C.T., 711 N.Y.S.2d 295, 299 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2000); Liston v. Pyles, 
1997 Ohio Ct. App. LEXIS 3627 at *16; T.B. v. L.R.M., 753 A.2d 873, 876-77 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 2000); Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959, 961 (R.I. 2000); Jones v. Fowler, 
969 S.W.2d 429, 431 (Tex. 1998); Titchenal v. Dexter, 693 A.2d 682, 690 (Vt. 1997); 
Holtzmann v. Knott, 533 N.W.2d 419,421 (Wis. 1995). 
48 Adoptions by same-sex couples have been approved (in reported cases) in eight 
states (Connecticut, Delaware, Jllinois, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, 
Pennsylvania, Vermont) and the District of Columbia. See In reAdoption of Baby Z., 
699 A.2d 1065, I 068 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1996) (permitting same-sex couple to apply to 
state adoption review board for waiver of adoption provision of "statutory parent" 
adoption, with adoption to be allowed upon granting of waiver); In re Hart, 806 A.2d 
1179, 1185 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2001); In re M.M.D., 662 A.2d 837, 843 (D.C. 1995); In re 
K.M., 653 N.E.2d 888, 899 (Ill. Ct. App. 1995); Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 
319 (Mass. 1993); Adoption ofTwo Children By H.N.R, 666 A.2d 535,536 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 1995); Matter of Jacob,660 N.E.2d 397,405 (N.Y. 1995); In reAdoption 
of E.O.G., 28 Pa. D. & C.4m 262, 265 (1993); In re Adoption of B.L.V.B .• 628 A.2d 
1271, 1273-4 (Vt. 1993). See also Elaine Herscher, At Long Last, They Are Family: 
State Permits Adoptions by Unmarried Couples, S.F. CHRON., Jan. II, 2000, at Al5 
(reporting reversal of California Department of Social Services policy rejecting 
unmarried partners as adoptive parents). 
49 See, e.g., Ann Shalleck, Foundational Myths and the Reality of Dependency: The 
Role of Marriage, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. POL 'y & L. 197, 201-02 ( 1999) ("[E)fforts 
to analogize other relationships to marriage, in order to achieve for those units the 
privileges of marriage, serve primarily to reinforce, rather than challenge, the primacy of 
the marriage relationship.") (citations omitted); Note, Looking for a Family 
Resemblance, supra note 12, at 1641 ("The functional approach acknowledges the 
paradigm of the nuclear family but also legitimizes non-nuclear relationships that share 
the essential characteristics of traditional relationships."). 
50 Language is an important indicator of (and contributor to) societal norms. The 
unmodified "family" is commonly used to describe the nuclear marital family. Family 
forms that differ from this model are frequently modified so as to identify the manner in 
which they differ from the norm-thus, they are "single-parent families" and "same-sex 
couples". See, e.g., FINEMAN, supra note 46, at 1-9 (1995). 
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Nonmarital families seeking to be recognized as families, moreover, 
have in some cases been held to a higher standard than marital nuclear 
families. For example, marital relationships that deviate in some way 
from the norm (e.g., the husband and wife who live in different cities 
and see each other only on weekends; or the couple that keeps financial 
affairs separate) nonetheless receive the benefits ofmarriage.51 
The law presumes the validity of the marital relationship. 
Nonmarital intimate relationships, on the other hand, have been denied 
legal recognition when the relationships do not comprise one or more of 
the features traditionally associated with the conventional marital 
family.52 
The normalizing of the nuclear marital family form is thus a 
significant-and perhaps fatal-drawback of the functional approach. 
And the approach suffers from another, closely related weakness: 
requisite identification of whose "conventional" modem family achieves 
norm status. The functional approach requires, moreover, that the 
norm-the prototypical family-be defmed. Once that norm is 
articulated, it becomes the reference point against which other 
relationships can be compared. The norm (here, the marital nuclear 
family) becomes defined even more narrowly. The result is that even 
those families who fall within the broad category of "marital family" can 
be nonetheless effectively defined out of that category. Their family 
form becomes one that law does not necessarily want to perpetuate. 
Explicit norm definition risks essentializing that which we think we 
know and can define (here, the "marital family"), without 
acknowledging or recognizing that our conceptions are colored by our 
own biases and experiences. The approach risks failing to recognize the 
diversity within the modem family, and by not acknowledging the 
51 See, e.g.,Treuthart, supra note 39, at 98. Treuthart observes that: 
!d. 
Neither pennanence, procreation, economic interdependence nor even 
sexual exclusivity is currently required for a valid marriage. Indeed, 
marriage partners could reside separate and apart from one another 
without sharing any aspects of their lives and still reap all the legal 
benefits of marriage unless their coupling could be deemed a sharn. 
52 See, e.g. , In re Guardianship of Kowalski, 382 N.W.2d 861 (Minn. Ct. App.), cert. 
denied, 475 U.S. 1085 (1986). The judge who inquired into the nature of the relationship 
between Sharon Kowalski and her partner placed as much importance on evidence that 
Kowalski had recently closed the couple's joint bank account as on other evidence ofthe 
couple's commitment within the relationship. See id. at 863. 
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legitimacy (or existence) of other experiences, it renders them inferior or 
invisible. 
The functional approach, finally, can lead to unpredictability. It is 
not always clear which feature or features will be sufficient for a 
nonmarital relationship to be considered a family. Further, judges may 
express their personal views about what sorts of relationships should 
count as a family by emphasizing certain functions over others-under 
the guise of exercising their discretion. 53 
Despite this litany of problems with functional analysis of marriage, 
Part III draws from this approach. But I aim to avoid the pitfalls of the 
standard approach. Unlike earlier functional analyses, my approach 
does not dismantle the marital family in order to identify those 
"essential" components that nontraditional families ought to mimic in 
order to receive the same benefits. Instead, this revised functional 
approach offers a method to those who promote marriage as social 
policy and privilege it in law for doing what I believe is essential: 
subjecting the institution itself-and the roles it plays in society-to 
more rigorous analysis. 
III. FUNCTIONALISM REDUX: DISMANTLING MODERN 
MARRIAGE 
Policymakers currently treat marriage as a private and all-but-
inscrutable relationship,54 yet a revised functional approach challenges 
53 See Martha L. Minow, Redefining Families: Who's In and Who's Out? 62 U. COLO. 
L. REv. 269,276-77 (1991). 
54 That is, at least until its dissolution, at which time the state may intervene and 
decide economic distribution, ongoing financial obligations between the parties, and 
rights of child custody and visitation. 
There are a number of exceptions to state respect for marital privacy. One relatively 
recent exception is the refusal of law to tolerate violence within families. See, e.g., 
Warren v. State, 336 S.E.2d 221, 222 (Ga. 1985) (rejecting the spousal rape exception, 
which made it legally impossible for a husband to be guilty of raping his wife); State ex 
rei. Williams v. Marsh, 626 S.W.2d 223,227 (Mo. 1982) (upholding the constitutionality 
of a state statute that permits any adult abused by a household member or former 
household member to obtain an ex parte order of protection). 
Another exception is the common law requirement that some minimum level of support 
be provided within marriage. See, e.g., Sharpe Furniture, Inc. v. Buchstaff, 299 N.W.2d 
219, 220 (Wis. 1980). The Court in Sharpe held a husband liable under the doctrine of 
necessaries for the cost of a sofa purchased on credit by his wife. The doctrine of 
necessaries provides that, "when an item or service is obtained for the benefit of the 
family which is necessary and no payment for that item or service has been made .. . the 
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the perception of marriage as a benevolent monolith. It instead allows 
for more precise identification of the ways in which marriage may 
further social goals and lays bare those aspects of marriage that may not 
contribute to any identifiable social good. 
I take as a starting point a vision of the idealized marriage, derived 
from conceptions of the modern marital family discussed in Part II 
above. 55 I consciously use as a framework a normative vision of 
marriage-not necessarily marriage as it is actually experienced, but 
rather an idealized conception of marriage embraced by its proponents. I 
adopt this approach for two reasons: First, using a paradigm that 
presumes a marriage that functions in society the way it is "supposed to" 
can illustrate more powerfully that serious problems exist with the use of 
marriage as state policy. Second, there is no "every-marriage". As 
Barbara Stark has pointed out, "[t]here are innumerable marriages, ... 
and most of them go through different phases. "56 It is not the purpose of 
this Article to describe the many manifestations of the marital 
relationship or illustrate the myriad ways in which marriages fail. The 
Article maintains instead that, given the functions performed by even the 
most successful marriages, state privileging and promoting of the 
institution as a whole is both indefensible as ideology and inefficient as 
policy. 
I next dissect this idealized vision of marriage into its component 
functions, analyzing each individually. These separate analyses depart 
somewhat from the normative in order to descriptively address each 
component, and to consider the theoretical basis for state involvement in 
husband is primarily liable." /d. The Court found the sofa to be a necessary item 
benefiting the family. But cf Cheshire Medical Center v. Holbrook, 663 A.2d 1344, 
1347 (N.H. 1995) (finding the gender bias of doctrine of necessaries unconstitutional, 
and instead imposing a reciprocal obligation of support on both partners to a marriage). 
See also McGuire v. McGuire, 59 N.W.2d 336,342 (Neb. 1953) (denying wife's petition 
for maintenance and support when husband and wife lived together and husband 
provided minimally for her maintenance-"[t]he living standard of a family are a matter 
of concern to the household, and not for the courts to determine."). 
As these cases illustrate, a spouse must take piecemeal steps to assure her level of 
support (for example, buying on credit, getting sued, and then obtaining her partner's 
contribution), but she is not permitted to bring a support action to secure that right 
through a single overall remedy. 
In virtually all other respects, however, the state recognizes the privacy of the intact 
marital relationship. See f{NEMAN, supra note 32, at 177-93. 
55 See discussion infra Part II.A. 
56 Barbara Stark, Marriage Proposals: From One-Size-Fits-All to Postmodern 
Marriage Law, 89 CAL. L. REv. 1479, 1483 (2001). 
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each. After examining each of the primary functional components of 
marriage, I conclude that active state involvement is independently 
justified in only two of the primary functional components of the marital 
family, dependent caretaking and the provision of economic support. 
The implications of this argument are discussed in Part IV. 
Some may object to the notion that marriage can be broken down 
and analyzed according to its various functions, arguing that the whole is 
more than the sum of its parts and that marriage is in some respects 
inscrutable. For instance, Bruce Hafen contemplates that an 
unidentifiable "something about the combined permanence, authority, 
and love that characterize the formal family uniquely makes possible" 
the work of teaching children moral and civic duty. 57 It is difficult to 
address such arguments. One surmises that their often-unspoken origin 
rests simply in the relative prevalence and success of the marital family 
in society. Because this is the conventional family form and the one that 
has been exclusively supported and subsidized throughout this country's 
history, it is unsurprising that it is also the family form that feels natural 
and right to the majority of us. I argue that if we are going to embrace a 
social policy that favors marital families over others, we must be able to 
articulate a reasoned justification for it. A romantic ideal of the marital 
relationship and family is insufficient ground upon which to rest public 
policy. 
A. "We Are Gathered Here": The Expressive Function of Marriage58 
Cass Sunstein has described the "expressive dimension" of conduct 
as being, "very simply, the attitudes and commitments that the conduct 
signals."59 Conduct that may not have a consciously or explicitly 
expressive purpose (and thus might not be considered "expressive 
conduct" or "symbolic speech"60 under First Amendment analysis) 
57 Bruce Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy; 
Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81 MICH. L. REv. 463, 477 (1983) 
~emphasis added). 
8 Diane Weinroth of American University and Judith Sandalow of the Children's Law 
Center shared with me their views on the expressive aspect of marriage. Those 
conversations led to the development of this section. 
59 Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 CoLUM. L. REv. 903, 925 
(1996). I am not referring here to the expressive dimension oflaw. See also Elizabeth S. 
Scott, Social Norms and the Legal Regulation of Marriage, 86 VA. L. REV. 1901, 1955-
56 (2000). 
60 See, e.g.. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288,293 (1984) 
(observing that 'a message may be delivered by conduct that is intended to be 
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nonetheless frequently has an expressive effect. An actor's conduct may 
thus communicate to observers certain attitudes or beliefs, regardless of 
whether the actor intends, or is even aware of, the message or messages 
conveyed.61 Those who marry, by committing that very act, convey a 
very particular set of messages-for example, love for and commitment 
to another, but also implicit approval of the privileging of heterosexual 
norms-the communication of which the state should neither promote 
nor discourage. 62 
The expressive component of marriage has much power, and thus 
importance, for a number of reasons. First, the sheer number of people 
who marry magnifies the act's communicative effect. Some 90 percent 
of all Americans will marry during their lifetimes, and more than 70 
percent of people who divorce remarry.63 Second, because the state 
requires that the commitment be made publicly, the communicative 
effect is necessarily more significant than it is for non-public forms of 
conduct. In fact, for many people, their engagement and wedding 
announcements, wedding invitations, and the actual declaration of 
marriage vows in the wedding ceremony are among the most public 
statements they ever make. Both legal requirements and extralegal 
norms, which are inextricably linked,64 have historically operated 
together to make this so. 
Since colonial times, the state has encouraged couples to formalize 
their relationships by marrying in accordance with nuptiallaws.65 All of 
the colonial provinces enacted marriage codes based on British law. 
These codes set forth procedures with which couples were required to 
communicative and that, in context, would reasonably be understood by the viewer to be 
communicative.") (emphasis added). 
6! Sunstein, supra note 59, at 925. 
62 See infra notes 55-86 and accompanying text. 
63 See, STEPHANIE COONTZ, THEW A Y WE NEVER WERE: AMERICAN fAMILIES AND THE 
NOSTALGIA TRAP 15 (1993). In 2001, for example, 2, 327,000 couples married. See also 
NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, State and Territorial Data, in FAST STATS: 
A TO Z, available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fasats/marriage.htm (last visited March 
15, 2004). 
64 
"Extralegal" norms include social, cultural, and religious norms. See Stark, supra 
note 56, at 1492. See generally Sunstein, supra note 59, at 907 ("[B]ehavior is 
pervasively a function of norms ... [and] norm management is an important strategy for 
accomplishing the objectives of law . . .. "). Legal rules can shape, and be shaped by, 
extralegal norms. Legislators obviously cannot directly change extralegal societal 
norms. But to the extent those norms reflect existing legal rules, they can rewrite those 
rules. 
65 Supra note 5, at 64-69. 
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comply in order to legally marry. Many of these procedures highlighted 
the public aspect of marriage, and the community's interest and 
involvement in marital relationships. For example, couples were 
required to publicize their intention to marry. The posting of marriage 
announcements, or "banns," as they were known, informed the 
community of the couple's intentions to marry and so ensured that 
anyone who objected to the union might come forward and intervene.66 
While no longer legally required, public announcement of 
engagements and weddings, frequently in local newspapers, remains a 
common practice today. State regulations continue in other ways to 
require that entry into marriage-in many ways an intimate and private 
relationship--be a public act. Couples must obtain state-issued (and 
publicly-recorded) licenses and conduct ceremonies in compliance with 
state regulations in order for their marriages to be valid.67 Furthermore, 
while most state regulations merely require the presence of a witness or 
witnesses to the marriage ceremony, it is customary for the couple's 
community of kinfolk and friends (as many as can attend or be 
accommodated) to attend and celebrate a couple's nuptials. 
In the face of this relentless institutionalization of matrimony, 
common law marriage, which requires no state act or involvement for its 
validation, is a rapidly disappearing example of a privatized domestic 
relationship.68 For a marriage to be valid at common law, parties must 
simply have the legal capacity to marry, agree to marry, cohabit, and 
consistently hold themselves out as married. 69 No state-sanctioned 
official need to officiate, nor must there be a wedding or marriage 
66 !d. at 67-69. Engaged couples were required to post notice of their pending nuptials 
in a conspicuous place for a specified period of time prior to their wedding. !d. at 67. In 
an alternate procedure, known as licensing, a magistrate conveyed upon the couple the 
community's blessing of their union. !d. Banns were replaced, beginning in the mid-19111 
century, by advance notice requirements. !d. at 93. These requirements imposed waiting 
geriods before a couple would be permitted to marry. !d. 
7 See HOMER H. CLARK, JR., & ANN LAQUER ESTIN, CASES AND PROBLEMS ON 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS 99-100 (6111 ed., 2000). 
68 See Naomi R. Cahn, The Moral Complexities of Family Law, 50 STAN. L. REv. 225, 
256 ( 1997) [hereinafter Cahn, Moral Complexities]; Cynthia Grant Bowman, A Feminist 
Proposal to Bring Back Common Law Marriage, 75 OR. L. REV. 709,712 (1996). 
69 See, Cahn, Moral Complexities, supra note 68. See also, e.g., TEX. F AM. CODE 
ANN. § 2.401 (Vernon 2004) (declaring common law marriage valid if proven by 
evidence indicating parties to relationship agreed to be married, cohabited as man and 
wife, and represented themselves to others as married). A minority of states continue to 
recognize common law marriage. See infra note 72. 
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license.70 In the early twentieth century, two-thirds of the states 
recognized common law marriage. 71 It has since been abolished in all 
but eleven states and the District of Columbia.72 Its decline assures that 
entry into marriage will continue to be a public, as opposed to private, 
act.73 
What messages are communicated by those who marry? Typically, 
the most intentional and visible message is the public expression of love 
for and lifelong commitment to another. Indeed, in Turner v. Safley, the 
Supreme Court explicitly recognized this aspect of marriage in the 
process of protecting prisoners' right to marry while incarcerated. The 
Court reasoned that even if one spouse were physically absent from the 
marriage, there were other important elements of the marital relationship 
70 See Cahn, Moral Complexities, supra note 59, at 256. 
71 See, Bowman , supra note 59, at n.24. See also GRAHAM DoUTHWAITE, 
UNMARRIED COUPLES AND THE LAW, 274-607 (1979), for a state-by-state analysis of the 
status of common law marriage. Ten states had abolished common law marriage by 
1920, including Alaska (1917), Arizona (1913), Arkansas (1875), California (1985), 
Hawaii (1920), Illinois (1905), Kentucky (1952), Massachusetts (1892), North Dakota 
(1890), and Wisconsin (1917). Id., at 279, 283, 287, 291, 343, 353, 377,410,496, 598. 
After 1921 (and as recently as 1997), an additional 19 states abolished common law 
marriage. These states included Florida (1968), Georgia (1997), Indiana ( 1958), 
Michigan (1957), Minnesota (1941), Mississippi (1956), Missouri (1921), Nebraska 
(1923), Nevada (1943), New Jersey (1939), New York (1933), North Carolina (1975), 
Ohio (1991), Oklahoma (1994), Oregon (1976), South Dakota (1959), Tennessee (1955), 
Vermont (1978), and Washington (1937). !d. at 325, 334, 362, 418, 425,431, 436, 448, 
453,462,479,490,501,509,518,548,554,578,588. 
72 Those jurisdictions that continue to recognize common law marriages are Alabama, 
Colorado, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Montana, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, 
Utah, Texas, and the District of Columbia. See IDAHO CODE § 32-301 (1995) 
(recognizing only those common law marriages entered into prior to January I, 1996); 
IOWA CODE ANN. § 595.11 (1997); KAN. STAT. ANN .. § 23-101 (2002); MONT. CODE 
ANN. §§ 26-1-602, 40-1-403 (2003); 43 OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 1 (2001); 23 PA. CoNS. 
STAT. ANN.§ 1003 (2003); S.C. CODE ANN.§ 20-l-360 (2003); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. 
§ 2.401 (1998); Piel v. Brown, 361 So.2d 90, 93 (Ala. 1978); Deter v. Deter, 484 P.2d 
805, 806 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971); Johnson v. Young, 372 A.2d 992, 994 (D.C. 1977); 
Souza v. O'Hara, 395 A.2d 1060,1061-62 (R.I. 1978). 73 Cahn notes this: 
... [T]he virtual abolition of common law marriage has made entry into 
marriage less private, thus reinforcing the public nature of marriage . . . A 
common law marriage does not require any official state involvement for 
its validation: no 'wedding,' no marriage license, and no state-sanctioned 
person to declare the parties 'husband and wife.' As such, common law 
marriage is a wonderful example of privatized domestic relations, yet it is 
disappearing. 
Cahn, Moral Complexities at 256. 
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that remained deserving of constitutional protection. 74 The first element 
discussed by the Court was the expressive component of marriage. 
Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court, described mamages as 
compnsmg "expressions of emotional support and public 
cornmi tment. "75 
Many Americans consider marriage a religious ceremony and 
institution, even though the religious (or cultural) and civil elements of 
marriages are conceptually and effectively distinct.76 The state 
recognizes and gives legal effect only to marriages entered into in 
accordance with civil regulations. 77 While many marriage ceremonies 
combine both religious or cultural aspects and compliance with civil 
requirements, a religious component is unnecessary for a valid civil 
marriage. Yet despite the formal separation of church and state, 
Christian tenets are reflected through legislation and in case law 
governing marriage.78 Anglo-American marriage laws were derived 
from the Christian tradition of indissolubility and followed canon law.79 
74 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78,95 {1987). 
75 !d. at 95-96. 
76 This widespread sentiment has found its way into law. The D.C. Code provides an 
example: 
For the purpose of preserving the evidence of marriages in the District of 
Columbia, every minister of any religious society approved or ordained 
according to the ceremonies of his religious society, whether his residence 
is in the District of Columbia or elsewhere ... may be authorized by any 
judge of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia to celebrate 
marriages in the District of Columbia. 
2001 D.C. STAT. § 46-406. The statute goes on to permit only one other 
group-"any judge or justice of any court of record"-to celebrate 
marriages in the District of Columbia. /d.. President George W. Bush, at 
a recent press conference expressed his belief that "[m]arriage cannot be 
severed from its cultural, religious, and natural roots without weakening 
[its] good influence [on] society." 
Bush, supra note 4. 
77 See CLARK &ESTIN, supra note 67, at 99-l 00. 
78 NANCY F. Con, PUBLIC VOWS 6 {2000); GROSSBERG, supra note 5, at 66. See also 
Carol Weisbrod, Family, Church, and State: An Essay on Constitutionalism and 
Religious Authority,26 J. FAMJLY LAW 741, 750-66 (1987-88). We would be naive to 
believe that religion-influenced legislation or policy is a thing of the past. House 
majority leader Tom DeLay, for instance, was quoted as insisting that "only Christianity 
offers a way to live in response to the realities that we find in this world--<>nly 
Christianity." DeLay went on to claim that he was "on a mission from God to promote a 
'biblical worldview' in American politics." Paul Krugman, Editorial, Gotta Have Faith, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2002, at A3S. 
79 See generally Peter J. Riga, Residue of Romano-Canonical Marriage Law in 
Modern American Law, 5 WHITTIER L. REv. 37 (1983) (tracing the historical and cultural 
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The Turner Court noted that "the commitment of marriage may be an 
exercise of religious faith as well as an expression of personal 
dedication."80 The opposite-sex requirement-a constant, of course, of 
marriage-related legislation at the federal and state levels-also has its 
origins in the Christian biblical tradition.81 Historically, and even today, 
judicial decisions in the United States-especially those concerning 
marriage and family law-are replete with expressions and applications 
of Christian ideals and values. 82 While the Christian imperative has 
been less explicitly invoked in recent court decisions (for example, those 
involving same-sex unions), it continues to inform legal outcomes.83 
genealogy of our modem legal system of marriage). In the country's earlier days, the 
Supreme Court acknowledged the primacy of Christianity in the United States. See 
Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 471 (1892) (referring to the 
United States as a "Christian nation"); United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 625 
( 1931) (referring to Church of the Holy Trinity for the proposition that the citizens of the 
United States are a "Christian people"). 
80 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. at 96. 
81 See Leviticus 18:22 (Revised Standard Version) ("You shall not lie with a male as 
with a woman; it is an abomination."). See also Leviticus 20:13 (Revised Standard 
Version) ("If a man lies with a male as with a woman, both of them have committed an 
abomination; they shall be put to death, their blood is upon them."). 
82 For example, in an early case deciding that only monogamous marriages would 
remain legal, the Supreme Court stated that "polygamy is . . . contrary to the spirit of 
Christianity and of the civilization which Christianity has produced in the western 
world." Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. I, 49 
(1890). Christian morality and value systems have provided the underpinning for how 
the state conceives of monogamous marriage. See, e.g., Davis v. Beason, 113 U.S. 333 
( 1890). The Court justified the suppression of polygamy with reference to Christian 
values and "the whole punitive power of the government for acts, recognized by the 
general consent of the Christian world in modem times as proper matters for prohibitory 
legislation." !d .. at 343. See also In re Siveke, 441 N.Y.S.2d 631, 634 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1981) ("Of course, the proposition that the relationship of husband and wife is special 
and unique finds support in scripture as well, wherein we are told, 'Therefore a man 
leaves his father and mother and cleaves to his wife, and they become one flesh."') 
(citing Genesis 2:24); Dan S. Browning, Biology, Ethics, and Narrative in Christian 
Family Theory, 119, 119-56, in PROMISES TO KEEP: DECLINE AND RENEWAL OF 
MARRIAGE IN AMERICA (Popenoe, et al., eds. 1996); Scott C. Idleman, Note, The Role of 
Religious Values in Judicial Decision Making, 68 IND. L.J. 433, 474-477 (1993). 
83 See Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097 (lith Cir. 1997) (upholding a State Attorney 
General's revocation of a job offer to the plaintiff because the plaintiff had married her 
same-sex partner in a religious ceremony). In Shahar, the plaintiff argued that her 
marriage was a protected exercise of her religion. The court disagreed, reasoning that, 
"[g]iven especially that Plaintiffs religion requires a woman neither to 'marry' another 
female-even in the case of lesbian couples-nor to marry at all, considerable doubt also 
exists that she has a constitutionally protected federal right to be 'married' to another 
woman to engage in her religion." !d. at 1099. See also, Mark Strasser, Same-Sex 
Marriages and Civil Unions: On Meaning, Free Exercise, and Constitutional 
Guarantees, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 597 (2002). According to Strasser, the court's decision 
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Given this tradition and the continued linking of marriage and religion, 
marriage can symbolize acceptance by the marrying couple of both the 
moral and religious conventions of society. 
Those who marry also communicate that they possess the maturity 
and responsibility necessary to fulfill the legal responsibilities of 
marriage. 84 Public expression of these personal relationship traits can be 
vital to an individual's conception and construction of personal identity. 
The state protects and facilitates this personal expression. As illustrated 
by the Court's opinion in Turner, the civil status of marriage lends 
additional credibility and weight to the individual's statements of marital 
commitment.85 But arguably less benign (and sometimes unintended) 
messages are necessarily conveyed as well when couples marry. 
One such message is approval of societal privileging of 
monogamous, heterosexual norms. Through the wedding ceremony, and 
by its very entry into the marital institution, a couple expresses its 
intention to conform to those norms.86 This is true even of married 
in Shahar directly violates Supreme Court right-to-marry jurisprudence as articulated in 
Turner. He argues that 
[t]he Turner Court did not suggest that marriage would have religious 
significance only if a duty to marry had been imposed by that religion, and 
Turner makes clear that the state would be remiss for imposing 
unnecessary burdens on marriage even without an explicit religious duty 
to tie a marital knot. 
!d. at 616. 
As one might expect, with the right to marry becoming more fundamental in recent 
years, courts addressing the constitutionality of many marriage restrictions have 
generally avoided overt expressions of Christian tenets. See generally Strasser, supra. 
Since marriage has been held to constitute a fundamental right, courts now attempt to 
examine whether a restriction on marriage-such as the prohibition of polygamy-is 
narrowly tailored to promote a compelling state interest. See Potter v. Murray City, 585 
F.Supp. 1126, 1140 (D. Utah 1984) ("There appear to the court to be no reasonable 
alternatives to the prohibition of the practice of polygamy to meet the compelling state 
interest found in the maintenance of the system of monogamy upon which its social 
order is now based."). 
84 Martha L. Fineman, Images of Mothers in Poverty Discourses, 1991 DUKE L.J. 274, 
290-91 (1991). In discussing her view of the ideology of patriarchy, Fineman has 
described the "heterosexual expression traditionally realized through marriage" as 
portraying within popular culture the "quintessential indication of maturity, 
completeness, success, and power." !d. 85 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. at 95-96. See also David B. Cruz, "Just Don't Ca/1/t 
Marriage": The First Amendment and Marriage as an Expressive Resource, ?4 S. CA.L. 
L. REv. 925, 933-34 (2001). 
86 One sociologist has described weddings as "one of the major events that signal[s] 
readiness and prepare[s] heterosexuals for membership in marriage as an organized 
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individuals who in fact disapprove of the exclusion of same-sex couples 
(or other excluded groupings) from civil marriage. Voluntary 
membership in an organization or institution suggests approval of its 
goals, as well as its rules-i.e., the means, in part, by which those goals 
are furthered. A white person's membership in a country club that 
excludes African Americans, for example, communicates something 
about that person's feelings about racial privileging. At best, it 
communicates that the white member doesn't feel strongly enough about 
the exclusion of African Americans to refuse on principled grounds to 
participate in the institution him or herself. At worst, it communicates 
agreement with the exclusionary policy. 
Too often, those of us with certain privileges are oblivious of the 
benefits they confer upon us. 87 Yet exercising privilege can perpetuate 
the systematic oppression of those to whom the privilege is denied. 
Unlike overt acts of cruelty, which may be readily identified as 
oppression, the role of subtler systems of privilege in conferring 
dominance upon certain groups while oppressing others is easily 
overlooked.88 As Jane Aiken has argued, "[t]he invisibility of privilege 
allows us to reinforce dominance without any moral accountability for 
our actions ... [but] one's exercise of privilege indirectly causes pain to 
practice for the institution of heterosexuality." DAVID M. NEWMAN & ELIZABETH 
GRAUERHOLZ, SOCIOLOGY OF FAMILIES 269 (2rd ed., 2002). 
87 See Stephanie M. Wildman & Adrienne D. Davis, Language and Silence: Making 
Systems of Privilege Visible, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 881, 882 (1995). Examples of 
unconscious privilege include race (or white skin) privilege, class privilege, male gender 
privilege, and heterosexual privilege. See also, CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A 
FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 224 (1989) (discussing male privilege); Barbara J. 
Flagg, "Was Blind, But Now I See": White Race Consciousness and the Requirement of 
Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REv. 953, 970 (1993) (discussing the invisibility of 
whiteness and race privilege). 
88 Frye argues that the combined privileges conferred on individuals or groups 
possessing a favored characteristic construct invisible systems of oppression for those 
denied such privileges. She offers the analogy of a bird in a cage to illustrate: 
Consider a birdcage. If you look very closely at just one wire in the cage, 
you cannot see the other wires . . . It is only when you step back, stop 
looking at the wires one by one, microscopically, and take a macroscopic 
view of the whole cage, that you see why the bird does not go 
anywhere . . . It is perfectly obvious that the bird is surrounded by a 
network of systematically related barriers, no one of which would be the 
least hindrance to its flight, but which, by their relations to each other, are 
as confining as the solid walls of a dungeon. 
MARILYN FRYE, THE POLITICS OF REALITY: ESSAYS ON FEMINIST THEORY 4-5 (1983). 
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others."89 Civil marnage ts, and has always been, an exclusive 
institution. It is exclusively heterosexual-all states currently prohibit 
same-sex couples from entering into civil marriage.90 The mixed-sex 
requirement is so ingrained that many who argue for its retention 
consider a tautological argument-that homosexuals should be 
prohibited from marrying because marriage is by definition a 
heterosexual relationship--convincing. 91 
Couples who marry thus implicitly communicate approval (or, at 
best, lack of principled disapproval) of the institutionalized heterosexual 
privileging that is marriage-whether they intend to communicate this 
approval or not.92 Conversely, same-sex couples and others who cannot 
89 Jane Harris Aiken, Striving to Teach "Justice, Fairness, and Morality", 4 CLINICAL 
L. REv. 1, 18 (1997) (internal citation omitted). 
90 Vermont has enacted a "civil union" statute that provides gay couples with the 
tangible benefits of marriage. 15 VT. STAT. ANN .. § 1201 (2003). But the statute stops 
short of permitting them to marry. /d. at § 120 I ( 4) (defining "marriage" as the "union of 
one man and one woman."). Vermont does "[go] beyond existing 'domestic partnership' 
and 'reciprocal beneficiaries' laws that exist in California and Hawaii and in many 
localities in the U.S. today." National Conference of State Legislatures, Same Sex 
Marriage, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES WEB SITE, last visited April 
9, 2004, at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/cyf/samesex.htm#DOMA. 
In November 2003, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruled that prohibiting 
same-sex marriage violates the state constitution. Goodridge v. Department of Public 
Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). The court stayed the decision for 180 days to 
allow the legislature to "take such action as it may deem appropriate in light of this 
opinion." /d. at 970. 
9 See, e.g., Defense of Marriage Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738C and 1 U.S.C.A. § 7 
(1998). See also, President George W. Bush, News Conference in the White House Rose 
Garden, supra note 66. Bush stated that "[the issue is} the defmition of marriage ... I 
believe a marriage is between a man and a woman. And I think we ought to codify that 
one way or the other."; Neil A. Lewis, Bush Backs Bid to Block Gays from Marrying, 
N.Y. TiMES, Jul. 31, 2003, at AI. See also, Bush, supra note 4 (transcribed by FDCH E-
Media). · 
92 Indeed, one might conceivably argue that, in order for a couple to enjoy the benefits 
of marriage, they must subject themselves, in the words of Chief Justice Burger, to a: 
state measure which forces an individual as part of his daily life ... to be 
an instrument for fostering public adherence to an ideological point of 
view he finds unacceptable. In doing so, the State "invades the sphere of 
intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment ... to 
reserve from all official control. 
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (internal citations omitted). The U.S. Supreme 
Court in Wooley held unconstitutional a New Hampshire law that required most 
automobiles to bear license plates with the state motto, "Live Free or Die". The Court 
found that the law in effect required motorists to use their private property as "mobile 
billboard[s]" for the State's ideological message. Chief Justice Burger emphasized that 
the First Amendment protected "the right to refrain from speaking at all." /d. at 714-715. 
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marry 93 are deprived of what David Cruz calls "the unique expressive 
resource that is civil marriage. "94 Those whose religious or cultural 
belief systems embrace different forms of marriage (e.g., Mormon and 
Muslim polygamy and Native American complex marriage95) are not 
only denied the expressive resource that is marriage, but instead their 
family forms are also outlawed.96 While these individuals may possess 
sentiments of love for and commitment to each other quite 
indistinguishable from those of mixed-sex couples, those sentiments are 
denied both the public expression and validation that is bestowed upon 
married couples.97 Cruz argues that: 
Marital commitment is expressed not simply by ceremonies, 
rings, and gifts. It is also expressed by the act of 
undertaking and continuing to live under the responsibilities 
of civil marriage, and by letting it be known that one is 
living as a part of a civil marriage. One's statements of 
marital commitment gain additional credibility from the civil 
status. A proposition of (civil) marriage is an invitation to a 
partner to join a publicly valued institution, not simply to 
maintain a relationship in the realm of the private.98 
Their exclusion from the marital institution conveys to same-sex 
couples and other excluded individuals that their families are not equally 
valued participants in society.99 Heterosexuals' continuing entry into 
93 For example, couples who may want to enter committed, non-conjugal relationships 
cannot enter valid marriages. See discussion infra Part III.C (noting that 
unconsummated marriages are considered void and may be annulled). Similarly, those 
who wish to form committed (conjugal or non-conjugal) relationships comprising more 
than two individuals may not marry. See supra note 83 and accompanying text (noting 
the illegality of polygamous marriages). 94 Cruz, supra note 85, at 928-929. 95 See COTI, PUBLIC Vows, at 9-10,25-28. 
96 See Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 136 U.S. 1 (1890); Potter v. 
Murray City, 585 F.Supp. 1126, 1140 (D. Utah 1984); Con, PUBLIC Vows, at 24-28. 
97 Marriage is so woven into the fabric of our culture that its meaning is universally 
understood and receives public affirmation and approbation. Upon entry into marriage, 
an individual's status in society is fundamentally transformed. The couple's community 
bestows on the couple approval and esteem that is obtainable by no other discernible 
means. NEWMAN & GRAUERHOLZ, supra note 86, at 268. 98 Cruz, supra note 85, at 933. 
99 Several legal scholars argue that laws have communicative impact and have put 
forward expressive theories of law. The communicative impact of laws can lead to the 
altering of social norms. See Cass Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. 
PA. L. REv. 2021, 2029-44 (1996). See also, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, What do Alternative 
Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 591 (1996) (developing an expressivist approach to 
2004] Mistaking Marriage for Social Policy 335 
marriage in the face of homosexuals' continued exclusion implicitly 
validates this exclusion, whether heterosexuals actually approve of that 
continued exclusion or not. 
Marriage is thus a status that has come to have a definite, pre-
ordained meaning. That meaning is widely- and well-understood: 
marriage has become a state-sponsored shorthand through which certain 
individuals may publicly express their love for and commitment to each 
other. Those individuals also express their membership in, and 
conformity with, mainstream morality and moral traditions Only 
heterosexual, monogamous couples may participate in these traditions-
many other members of society are necessarily excluded both from 
participating in the ceremonies and from benefiting from the legal 
implications of marriage. By publicly exercising their marital privilege, 
marrying couples reinforce the dominance of certain religious and moral 
traditions over others. In order to receive the benefits of marriage, 
couples must thus participate in the systematic oppression of those for 
whom marriage is not an option. 
I argue that the state's interest in expressions of intimate 
commitment is limited to protecting individuals' freedom to express 
their commitments in the manner they see fit and to protecting 
individuals' rights to exercise their religious beliefs without undue 
interference. But the state has little interest in the content and form of 
individuals' expressions of intimate commitment. And it should 
certainly not dictate the content and meaning of that expression. Yet, 
through current marriage regulations that define who may and may not 
marry, specify certain terms of the relationship, and require that couples' 
entrance into the institution be a public act, the state does just that. 
B. "Till Death Do Us Part": The Companionate Function of Marriage 
[T]he value of commitment is fully realizable only in an 
atmosphere of freedom to choose whether a particular 
association will be fleeting or enduring .. . What begins to 
matter more for the husband is not that his wife was once 
laws prescribing criminal punishments); Paul Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term-
Forward: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REv. I, 8 (1976) 
(embracing and elaborating on the expressive rationale for the antidiscrimination 
principle adopted by the Supreme Court in Brown v. Bd. of Education, 347 U.S. 483 
( 1954)). But see, Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 
148 U. PA. L. REv. 1363 (2000) (rejecting expressive theories of Jaw and arguments that 
the meaning of governmental action can have "foundational moral relevance."). 
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ready to bind herself to him by ties enforceable by the state, 
but that she remains committed to him day by day-not 
because the law commands it but because she chooses the 
commitment ... [O]nce the act of marriage recedes into the 
past, the freedom to leave gives added meaning to the 
decision to stay .100 
When people marry, they affirm that they and their spouses will be 
lifelong companions. Companionship, mutual affection, and 
commitment between two adults are generally considered primary 
purposes of modem marriage. 101 Even the Roman Catholic Church, 
which has long focused on procreation as the primary purpose of 
marriage, now emphasizes the importance of commitment and 
companionship.102 
In the past, the law treated the marriage commitment differently than 
other commitments or contracts between individuals. 103 Laws governing 
contracts for personal services, for example, required that breach be 
remedied by the payment of damages. But laws governing marriage 
100 Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 633, 
637-38 (1980). 
101 One of many examples of this: Goodridge, supra note 90 at 948. 
102 See Vatican II, Gaudium et spes, 7 Dec. 1965, in VATICAN COUNCIL II: THE 
CONCILIAR AND POST CONCILIAR DOCUMENTS 950-57 (Austin Flannery, ed., 1975). The 
Council of Vatican II, articulating official church doctrine, stated: 
But marriage is not merely for the procreation of children: its nature as an 
indissoluble compact between two people and the good of the children 
demand that the mutual love of the partners be properly shown, that it 
should grow and mature. Even in cases where despite the intense desire of 
the spouses there are no children, marriage still retains its character of 
being a whole manner and communion of life and preserves its value and 
indissolubility. 
/d. at 954. See also, JUNE CARBONE, FROM PARTNERS TO PARENTS: THE SECOND 
REVOLUTION IN FAMILY LAW 135-36 (2000) (citing Fred J. Parrella, Same-Sex Marriage, 
November 6, 1998 (unpublished manuscript on file with author)). 
103 For a discussion of the ways in which marriages differ from other contracts, see, 
e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 159-160 (5"' ed. 1998). Posner 
discusses several distinctions between marriages and other contracts, noting that married 
couples: ( 1) are not free to set the terms of the contract; (2) are more severely sanctioned 
for breach; (3) cannot generally seek court intervention to help them settle disputes; and 
(4) are more likely to engage in conduct affecting third parties. /d. See also Darren 
Bush, Moving to the Left by Moving to the Right: A Law & Economics Defense of Same-
Sex Marriage, 22 WOMEN's Rrs. L. REP. l\5, \24 (200\). Bush argues that, "from an 
economic perspective, marriage appears no different than any other contract, having the 
same potential for efficiency (and inefficiency) as a contract between two corporations." 
/d. 
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enforced its indissolubility, requiring specific performance of marriage 
contracts.104 The state moved away from enforcing the indissolubility of 
marriage with the adoption of judicial divorce in the nineteenth 
century105 and no-fault divorce in the twentieth. 106 Popular pressure led 
to the development of these rules, and there is little chance that states 
will revert even to fault-based divorce rules. to? I nonetheless examine 
the nature of the state's interest in marital commitment, and whether that 
interest justifies intervention to enforce or reinforce couples' 
commitment to each other.tos 
Marriage and the nuclear family moved to the center of social and 
emotional life beginning in the nineteenth century. 109 Some point to 
rising expectations of the companionate aspects of marriage as ironically 
having contributed to increases in the divorce rate. 110 In his history of 
law and the family in the nineteenth century, Michael Grossberg writes 
that: 
[T]he surging demand for divorce reflected the increasingly 
intimate, emotional nature of marriage. No longer a mere partnership, 
over the course of the nineteenth century it became a bond based 
primarily on affection and thus one that would all the more easily 
disintegrate as feelings changed. By officially dissolving a marriage 
rather than informally separating, the parties freed themselves, in most 
states, to enter another union formally .. . 111 
I04 GROSSBERG, supra note 5, at 34-35. 
105 !d. at 238. 
106 See Henna Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: A Perspective on No-Fault Divorce 
and Its Aftermath, 56 U. CINN. L. REv. l, 44-51 (1987). 
107 See Carbone, supra note 5, at 281. Carbone observes that there "seems to be little 
sentiment for a return to fault-based divorce ... Public reaffirmation of the importance 
of marriage is unlikely to affect those for whom marriage is not an attractive or realistic 
o8:tion." [internal citations omitted]. 
1 8 I am speaking of lifelong marital commitment itself. The economic sharing and 
support, for example, that many have come to associate with lifelong commitment (but 
that can characterize many other relationships) is discussed infra. 
I09 See STEPHANIE COONTZ, supra note 63, at 8-23 {1992). 
110 
GROSSBERG, supra note 5, at 251. 
111 !d. (internal citation omitted). William O'Neill, whom Grossberg cites in his 
discussion of divorce and custody law, wrote that the need for divorce arises when 
"families become the center of social organization." When that happens, " their intimacy 
can become suffocating, their demands unbearable, and their expectations too high to be 
easily realizable. Divorce then becomes the safety valve that makes the system 
workable." WILLIAM L. O'NEILL, DIVORCE IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 6-7 ( 1967). 
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In the colonies, as in England, the virtual unavailability of divorce 
reflected state acceptance of the church's view of marriage as a sacred, 
lifelong commitment. The colonial states initially followed the English 
practice of permitting divorce only by legislative act.1 12 Such divorces 
were expensive, difficult to obtain and, unsurprisingly, rare. 113 In his 
History of American Law , Lawrence Friedman noted that such a legal 
system essentially resulted in two laws of divorce--one for the rich, and 
one for the poor. 114 Many unhappy, poor married couples simply began 
living apart; some entered into separation agreements, while others 
simply remarried. Indeed, bigamy, in the form of serial monogamy 
without divorce or death, was conunon. 115 But despite the presence in 
the United States, as in England, of income inequality, vast numbers of 
people in the U.S. (unlike in England) owned property and thus had a 
greater stake in society. This large American middle class demanded 
easier divorce methods to enable them to change and legitimize family 
relationships and clarify ownership ofproperty.116 
Judicial divorces became available towards the end of the eighteenth 
century, beginning with the New England states.117 By 1867, thirty-
112 GROSSBERG, supra note 5, at 238. See also LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY 
OF AMERICAN LAW 179-84 ( 1973). 113 See June Carbone & Margaret F. Brinig, Rethinking Marriage: Feminist Ideology, 
Economic Change, and Divorce Reform, 65 TUL. L. REv. 953, 971-72 (1991). See also, 
NELSON MANFRED BLAKE, THE ROAD TO RENO: A HISTORY OF DIVORCE IN THE UNITED 
STATES 31-32 (1962). Blake notes that, like the English Parliament, early state 
legislatures granted special Acts of divorce only to those with wealth and power. !d. at 
31. 114 FRIEDMAN, supra note ll2, at 179-84. 
115 HENDRIK HARTOG, MAN AND WIFE IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 86-87 (2000). Hartog, 
in his legal history of marriage in the U.S. from 1790 to 1950, emphasizes that many 
husbands and wives worked outside the law to end their marriages. First, many entered 
into separation agreements, which, he argues, were not merely a private contractual form 
of divorce. Instead, separation agreements resolved conflict within marriages by 
providing a mechanism that allowed a married couple to live apart. Second, one (or 
both) of the partners would simply move away and remarry. See id. at 76-92. Hartog 
notes that "[b]igamy or, rather, serial monogamy (without divorce or death) was a 
common social experience in early America." !d. at 87. Many who ended marriages in 
this way were poor people, for whom the property rights allocated at formal divorce held 
little concern. !d. 
116 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 112, at 182-84. 
117 See id. at 182. "Pennsylvania passed a general divorce law in 1785, Massachusetts 
one year later. Every New England state had a divorce law before 1800, along with New 
York, New Jersey, and Tennessee." !d. The southern states, and some oftheir neighbors, 
were slower to eliminate legislative divorce. Both Virginia and Maryland did away with 
the practice in 1851; Delaware was the last state to do away with legislative divorce in 
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three of thirty-seven American jurisdictions provided for judicial 
divorce. 118 With this increased availability, the divorce rate began to 
rise steeply in the mid-nineteenth century. This rising pattern of divorce 
continued into the twentieth century. 119 
Despite its increased accessibility, it wasn't until the mid-twentieth 
century that divorce by simple consent of the parties became 
available. 120 Before then, all states required a showing of significant 
misbehavior by one of the parties before a court would permit a couple 
to divorce. 121 Only an "innocent" spouse whose partner had committed 
adultery, abuse, or some other grave malfeasance would be granted a 
divorce. Unhappy couples who both wanted divorce, or who had simply 
given up on their marriages, frequently colluded to present divorce suits 
as the fault of one or the other of them in order to terminate their 
marriages. By the end of the nineteenth century, collusive divorces 
became the norm. 122 A different "dual law of divorce" has thus been 
described by Max Rheinstein as existing in the U.S. at that time: a 
formal statutory law that granted divorce only as punishment for serious 
1897. See Lawrence Friedman, Rights of Passage: Divorce Law in Historical 
Perspective, 63 OR. L. REv. 649, 652 (1984) [hereinafter Friedman, Rights of Passage]. 
ll8 GROSSBERG, supra note 5, at 251. 
119 See Max Rheinstein, The Law of Divorce and the Problem of Marriage Stability, 9 
VAND. L. REv. 633, 633 n.2 (1956). In 1867, the number of divorces per 100 marriages 
was approximately 2.8; in 1890, 5.8; in 1910, 8.8; in 1930; 17.4; and in 1949, 25.1. /d. 
See also, Naomi Cahn, Faithless Wives and Lazy Husbands: Gender Norms in 
Nineteenth-Century Divorce Law, 2002 U. ILL L. REv. 651, 659 (2002) ("A history of 
divorce shows that the transition to our 'divorce culture' began during the nineteenth 
century, rather than during the 1960's ... "). During the period between 1870 and 1880, 
the rate of divorce increased by approximately 80%; in the following decade, the divorce 
rate grew by 66.6%. !d. at 659 n.42. See also, BLAKE, supra note 113, at 134-36. 
120 See Kay, supra note 106 at 56. 
121 Permissible grounds for divorcing one' s spouse included adultery, bigamy, 
desertion, extreme cruelty, habitual drunkenness, and conviction of a felony. BLAKE, 
supra note 113, at 141-42. In addition, judges were permitted to take guilt or fault into 
account when granting divorce and ordering property division and alimony. !d. at 237; J. 
HERBIE DIFONZO, BENEATH THE FAULT LINE: THE POPULAR AND LEGAL CULTURE OF 
DIVORCE IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 44-45 (1997). 
122 See, e.g., Friedman, Rights of Passage, supra note 117, at 659 (declaring that, in 
virtually every state, the "main element [of its divorce court] was simply collusion, 
between husband and wife, lawyers, and judges"). See also Herma Hill Kay, An 
Appraisal of California 's No-Fault Divorce Law, 75 CAL. L. REv. 291, 299 (1987) 
(arguing that the adoption of no-fault grounds for divorce reflected a desire to "free the 
administration of justice ... from the hypocrisy and perjury that had resulted from the 
use of marital fault as a controlling consideration in divorce proceedings."). 
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marital misconduct and a liberal law that in practice amounted to divorce 
by consent. 123 
In 1969, California became the first state to replace its fault-based 
system with no-fault divorce.124 All states have since followed suit and 
have adopted some version of the no-fault regime.125 The current 
availability in all states of no-fault divorce rules now ensures a relatively 
facile exit from the bonds of marriage should either party so desire. 
Critics blame the no-fault regimes for having cheapened and 
destabilized marital commitment, making marriages "practically 
terminable at will."126 Some family theorists see the adoption of no-
fault divorce as having contributed to, if not precipitated, contemporary 
marital instability.127 Echoing the economic conception of family by 
Gary Becker, Allen Parkman has argued that some barrier to exit is 
necessary in order for the gains from specialization within marriage to 
be realized. Those gains will not be realized, for instance, if a wife 
123 MAx RHEINSTEIN, MARRIAGE STABILITY, DIVORCE AND THE LAW 51 (1972). See 
also, Henna Hill Kay, From the Second Sex to the Joint Venture: An Overview of 
Women's Rights and Family Law in the United States During the Twentieth Century, 88 
CAL. L. REv. 2017,2046-48 (2000). 
124 The California Family Law Act of 1969 defined irreconcilable differences as 
grounds for divorce. Family Law Act,§ 8, 1969 Cal. Stat. 3324 (current version at Cal. 
Civ. Code§ 2311 (Deering 1983 & Supp. 1994)). See also Kay, supra note 106, at 299-
300. The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act that accompanied the adoption of no-fault 
grounds provides that "[I]f both of the parties have stated under oath or affirmation that 
the marriage is irretrievably broken .. . the court, after hearing, shall make a fmding 
whether the marriage is irretrievably broken." UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT§ 
305, 9A U.L.A. 21, 211 (1987). See also Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: A 
Perspective on No-Fault Divorce and Its Aftermath, 56 U. CrNN. L. REV. I, 44-51 (1987) 
(discussing the legislative history behind the Act). 
125 South Dakota was the last state to change its laws, adding no-fault grounds to its 
divorce laws in 1985. S.D. Codified laws § 25-4-2(7). See also Friedman, Rights of 
Passage, supra note 117, at 659, describing the total triumph of no-fault divorce over 
fault-based systems: "[S]uddenly, the dam seemed to burst in divorce law. Twenty years 
ago, consensual divorce was a radical idea. Today, it is unquestioned fact. The old 
system collapsed completely; no-fault rushed into the vacuum. California was a pioneer 
state, but no-fault is now the rule almost everywhere." 
126 See, e.g., Robert E. Rodes, Jr., On Law and Chastity, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 643, 
712 (2001). 
127 See, e.g., BARBARA DAFOE WHITEHEAD, THE DIVORCE CULTURE 3-13 (1997); 
Milton C. Regan, Jr., Law, Marriage, and Intimate Commitment, 9 VA. J. Soc. PoL'v & 
L. 116 (2001) (arguing that the state is justified in promoting marital stability as a 
substantive good). See also Scott, supra note 59, at 1905. 
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holds up her part of the bargain and thus becomes more vulnerable, yet 
her husband is free to walk away and benefit from doing so. 128 
Rather than causing them, adoption of no-fault regimes primarily 
reflected changing social norms that viewed lifelong marriage as merely 
aspirational and divorce as a real option available to those whose 
marriages were, for whatever reason, no longer functional. \29 Evidence 
shows that, while Americans continue to take marital commitment 
seriously, they also remain wary of legislative efforts designed to 
reinforce that commitment. 130 Historical experience with first legislative 
and then fault-based judicial divorce illustrates that unhappy couples 
will resort to non-legal means, or manipulate available legal 
mechanisms, to end dysfunctional unions. The higher the state places 
the bar, the higher people will jump. 
By putting the decision to terminate a marriage in the hands of 
individuals, the state has reduced its involvement in the companionate 
function of marriage. In doing so, it has arguably signaled the 
increasingly limited scope of its interest in this function. There are other 
indications of limited state involvement in the companionate function of 
marriage. For instance, other than the imposition (in some states) of a 
nominal waiting period between obtaining a license to marry and the 
marriage ceremony, the state remains uninvolved in assuring the 
compatibility of the marrying couple. 131 Although there continues to be 
significant state intervention in and regulation of the economic 
consequences of divorce (as well as its effect on dependent children), 
there is currently no serious effort to restrict an individual's right to 
separate from or divorce her spouse. Indeed, as with other contracts for 
128 ALLEN M. PARKMAN, NO-FAULT DIVORCE: WHAT WENT WRONG? 78 (1992). 
Parkman believes that, without requiring mutual consent as a minimal prerequisite for 
divorce, no-fault regimes would lead to women refusing to make the "efficient" choice 
of staying home to rear their children. !d. 
129 June Carbone argues that "so potentially radical a set of reforms could sweep the 
fifty states in such a short time only because the conception of marriage on which fault 
was based had been obsolete for at least half a century." June Carbone, Income Sharing: 
Redefining the Family in Terms ofCommunity, 31 Hous. L. REv. 359, 367 (1994). See 
also, Laurence Drew Borten, Note, Sex, Procreation, and the State Interest in Marriage, 
102 COLUM. L. REv. 1089, 1091-92 (2002) (highlighting shifting cultural attitudes 
toward state regulation of marriage as a means of ordering individual sexual activity). 
130 Scott, supra note 59, at 1902-03. 
131 As discussed in Part Ill. A above, states no longer require publication of a couple's 
intent to marry, a requirement that facilitated community policing of individuals' entry 
into marriage. See supra notes 58-99 and accompanying text. 
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services that are not specifically enforced, there is real discomfort with 
the idea of state enforcement of an intimate relationship against either or 
both parties' wilJ.I32 
The normative question remains: should the state more actively 
enforce--or reinforce-a couple's commitment to remain together? Is 
there a connection between lifelong companionship and the public 
welfare? In theory, states could impose any number of additional 
barriers to divorce, including extending waiting (or "cooling off') 
periods; requiring couples to undergo counseling or mediation; 133 or 
reimposing fault-based divorce or otherwise limiting the grounds upon 
which divorce will be granted. 
Milton Regan and Elizabeth Scott are among the few legal scholars 
who have directly addressed the state's interest and role in the purely 
companionate aspects of the marital relationship. They both see the 
preservation of marital commitment-even among couples with no 
children and with comparable financial resources-as a societal good in 
and of itself.134 They argue that individuals have a "natural" preference 
for long-term commitment, which can be thwarted by short-term 
pressures. 135 Regan believes that the ability to make and keep 
commitments is critical to the "unity of the self," but because of societal 
pressures, individuals' ability to keep commitments becomes more 
tenuous and weakens over time.136 The state should thus help 
individuals realize their preferences by "shaping the payoff matrices for 
132 In the two states that have enacted covenant marriage statutes, compliance with 
those acts is optional--couples may elect to enter into covenant or non-covenant 
marriage. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 25-901 (2003); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:272 (West 
1998). 
133 Florida, for example, passed and then repealed legislation in the 1990s that 
required divorcing couples to undergo counseling and pursue mediation alternatives. See 
FLA. STAT. ch. 39.428 (repealed 1996). 
134 See, e.g., Regan, supra note 127 at 130 ("[C]ommitment is a good that society 
should actively promote because of its essential role in realizing the deeply-rooted 
as~iration that individuals lead lives that they can call their own."). 
13 See Regan, supra note 127; Scott, supra note 59. 
136 The primary societal pressures which Regan discusses are: ( 1) time-space 
compression (i.e., pervasive and rapidly-changing stimuli in entertainment and other 
areas of life move us from one context to another; and technologies like cell phones and 
e-mail result in individuals' being, in a sense, in more than one place at a time while 
engaging simultaneously in mu\tiple activities); 2) an ethos of mass consumer society; 
and 3) the ascendance of flexible production methods designed to respond rapidly to 
changes in consumer demand but which also introduce more risk and impermanence in 
workplace relationships. See Regan, supra note 127, at 132-40. 
2004] Mistaking Marriage for Social Policy 343 
different types of behavior" and thus enhancing individuals' ability to 
resist these influences. State intervention that makes exit from marriage 
more difficult, according to Regan, furthers the general happiness and 
well-being ofthe citizenry.I37 
This approach to family policy, however, has serious drawbacks. 
Not only does such a proposal smack of paternalism, but the assumption 
that people have "natural" preferences for long-term commitment is a 
troubling one in which to ground a policy decision. Such a proposal 
relies on a conception of individuals' preferences that is too narrow and 
uncertain to justify state action. Regan's proposal gives too little 
consideration to the powerful forces that create and shape preferences. 
For example, to the extent that the observation may be descriptively 
accurate, it is impossible to identify how much of that preference is truly 
innate and universal, and how much reflects individuals' internalization 
of legal and majority social norms that trumpet the propriety and 
"naturalness" of that preference. 138 Second, "long-term" itself can be 
variable: for one individual, "long-term" may be a commitment of five 
or seven years; for another, it may indeed be lifelong processes. Finally, 
even if individuals "prefer" long-term commitment, measures that 
attempt to enforce such commitments ignore the fact that individuals' 
development of identity and autonomy may be lifelong. Because an 
individual may change and develop over time, it is not clear why an 
individuals' stated preference at year one should outweigh her 
preference, informed by tim e and experience, at year five, ten, or 
twenty. Such a change of heart should be insufficient to invalidate a 
commercial contract, of course. But allowing easy exit from unhappy 
marriage does not preclude the state from enforcing other commitments 
made by couples (e.g., economic commitments made by couples to each 
other, economic and caretaking commitments made to third party 
dependents, and so on.). 
It may indeed be true that we are social beings and most of us crave 
companionship and some type of stability in our intimate relationships. 
137 See id. at 123-24. 
138 It is arguably not possible to identify the extent to which social ideologies shape 
law, or vice versa. As Nancy Cort points out in the introduction to her recent book on 
the history of marriage, "[llaw and society stand in a circular relation: social demands 
put pressure on legal practices, while at the same time the law' s public authority frames 
what people can envision for themselves .. . " NANCY F. Con, PUBLIC Vows: A 
HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 8 (2000) [hereinafter Con, PUBLIC VOWS]. 
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Nevertheless, I wonder whether most of us would agree ex ante to the 
state's intervening to 'save' our marital relationships at some future date, 
should our current commitment to remain with our chosen partner falter. 
I think not. Such intervention violates deeply-imbedded principles of 
autonomy and self-determination. 
Scott also proposes legal reforms that explicitly link spousal 
commitment with parental commitment, reinforcing spouses' 
commitment to stay together "for the sake of the children."139 Scott 
questions why "legal commitment [is] associated with choice in 
contract, but with coercion in marriage;"140 she might simply be 
answered thus: enforcement of the marriage contract forces continued 
intimacy, cohabitation, affection, and sex. It is also worth noting that 
enforcement of many contracts, including contracts for services, calls for 
the payment of damages rather than specific performance of the 
contract. 141 When adults no longer wish to be intimately associated with 
each other, principles of privacy and self-determination require that the 
state not force their continued association. 
Scott grounds her proposal on "accumulating evidence" 
demonstrating the harmful impact of divorce on children.142 That 
evidence, however, is more ambiguous than Scott and others would 
139 Scott, supra note 59, at 1962-66. According to Scott, strong historic associations 
between spousal commitment norms and "unpopular" gender norms have rendered legal 
reforms enforcing spousal commitment norms politically unfeasible. She argues that 
linking spousal commitment instead with parental commitment might avoid the negative 
"bundling" effect. /d. 
140 /d. at 1903. 
141 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 367 cmt. a (1981) (noting that 
refusal to resort to specific performance is based in part upon a reluctance to compel the 
continuance of personal association after disputes have arisen and relationships have 
likely deteriorated; also upon the reluctance to compel what might have the appearance 
of involuntary servitude). 
142 Scott, supra note 59, at 1965. Some sociologists have concluded that the spread of 
divorce and single-parent families contributes to many social problems, including 
poverty, crime, substance abuse, declining academic standards, and the erosion of 
neighborhoods and communities. See generally Paul R. Amato, Children of Divorce in 
the 1990's: An Update of the Amato & Keith (1991) Meta-Analysis, 15 JOURNAL OF 
FAMILY PSYCHOLOGY 355 (2001) (concluding that "[c]ompared with children with 
continuously married parents, children with divorced parents continued to score 
significantly lower on measures of academic achievement, conduct, psychological 
adjustment, self-concept, and social relations."). See also E. MAVIS HETHERINGTON AND 
JOHN KELLY, FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE: DIVORCE RECONSIDERED (2002); JUDITH S. 
WALLERSTEIN, SANDRA BLAKESLEE, AND JULIA M. LEWIS, THE UNEXPECTED LEGACY OF 
DIVORCE: A 25 YEAR LANDMARK STUDY (2000). 
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suggest. 143 Sociological data suggest that factors other than parents' 
divorce (including parents' continuing high-conflict marriages) hurt 
children. Studies have shown that children's well-being is more 
dependent on the level of family conflict than on the type of family 
structure. 144 Sociologists have also found that children can develop 
successfully in a variety of family structures, and that a number of other 
factors pose more serious threats to the well-being of adults and children 
than does marital instability, including poverty, abuse, neglect, poorly 
funded schools, and a lack of government services.145 We should reject 
such approaches, which detract from alternative measures that should be 
implemented to strengthen parental and societal support for all children, 
regardless of the marital status of their parents. l46 
C. "To Forsake All Others": Sex and Procreation 
Historically, legal and extralegal norms dictated that sex and 
procreation take place exclusively within the marital relationship. 147 
The state considers sex to be both essential and-ideally-exclusive to 
the marital contract. As recently as 1964, one court declared that the 
"standards of society are such that sexual relations or lascivious actions 
by persons who do not have the benefit of marriage to one another are 
regarded as obscene, unchaste and immora1."148 Sexual intercourse is an 
implied term of the marriage contract; most states' statutory or common 
143 For instance, one sociologist has pointed out that, in order to more accurately 
examine the impact of divorce on children, researchers should compare children of 
divorce not with children of all married parents, but with children of unhappily married 
parents who do not divorce. JUDITH STACEY, IN THE NAME OF THE FAMILY: RETHfNKING 
FAMILY VALUES fN THE POSTMODERN AGE 60 ( 1996). 
144 /d. 
145 See generally STEPHANIE COONTZ, THE WAY WE NEVER WERE: AMERJCAN 
FAMILIES AND THE NOSTALGIA TRAP 207-231 (2d. ed. 2000). In her introduction to the 
2nd edition of her book, Coontz notes the drop in recent years in violent crime and teen 
pregnancy and observes that, "[i]f divorce and unwed motherhood were the primary 
causes of crime and teen pregnancy, then these certainly would not have decreased in 
recent years, since the number of children raised in one-parent homes have continued to 
climb." /d. at xxvii. See also, Paul R. Amato, Diversity Within Single-Parent Families, 
in THE HANDBOOK OF FAMILY DIVERSITY 149-172 (David H. Demo, Katherine R. Allen, 
& Mark A. Fine, eds., 2000); JUDITH STACEY, supra note 142, at 60. Stacey discusses 
"statistical tricks" used by some researchers "to exaggerate advantages some children 
from two-parent families enjoy over their single-parented peers." /d. 
146 The issues concerning marriage and the caretaking of dependents will be taken up 
in Part III.D., infra. 
147 See GROSSBERG, supra note 5, at 64-152; Carbone, supra note 5, at 269-70. 
148 State v. Jones, 205 A.2d 507,509 (Conn. Cir. Ct. 1964). 
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law grants annulment149 of a marriage upon showing of one party's 
impotence, provided that the condition was unknown to the other party 
at the time of marriage. 15° Some states also consider impotence a 
ground for divorce. 151 Notably, marriage is one of exceedingly few 
contracts where the state permits sex to be an essential term. Indeed, 
most contracts in which sex is an essential term are void on public policy 
grounds.152 
Nevertheless, the pervasive and widespread contemporary 
acceptance of nonmarital sex strongly indicates that the public's notion 
of marriage as a necessary prerequisite to sex has eroded. Even more 
compelling than shifting public opinion, though, are developing notions 
of individuals' right to privacy, evident most recently in the Supreme 
Court's decision in Lawrence v. Texas. 153 In Lawrence, the U.S. 
Supreme Court held that a Texas statute that made it a crime for two 
persons of the same sex to engage in intimate sexual conduct was 
unconstitutional, as applied to adult males who had engaged in a 
consensual act of sodomy in the privacy of the home.154 In its opinion, 
the Court cited an "emerging awareness" over the past half century that 
149 Annulment is a judgment that a marriage is invalid due to the existence of some 
impediment at its formation. Because of state policy encouraging the permanence of 
marriage, annulments are not easily granted. Bigamous marriages and marriages 
between couples sharing an impermissible degree of consanguinity are generally 
considered void (never valid). Marriages that include fraud, physical incapacity, absence 
of legal capacity to consent (due to age or mental incapacity) or force or duress are 
generally considered voidable (able to be invalidated). See Albert Momjian, Annulment, 
in l FAMILY LAW AND PRACTICE§§ 5.02, 5.03 (Arnold H. Rutkin ed., 2003). 
150 E.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 2210(t) (West 1994) (permitting annulment where one 
spouse is "physically incapable of entering the marriage state"); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
ANN. 5/301(2) (West 1999) (permitting annulment where spouse "lacks the physical 
capacity to consummate the marriage"); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-l (West 2000) 
(permitting annulment upon showing that spouse is "incurably impotent"); N.Y. DoM. 
REL. LAW§§ 7(3), l40(d) (McKinney 1999) (permitting annulment where one spouse is 
"incapable of entering into the married state from physical causes"); TEX. FAM. CODE 
ANN.§ 6.106 (Vernon 1998) (permitting annulment upon a showing of"[i]mpotency"). 
151 E.g., MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 208, § l (Law. Co-op. 1994); MISS. CODE ANN.§ 93-
5-l (1994). 
152 See, e.g., Updeck v. Samuel, 123 Cal.App.2d 264, 267 P.2d 822 (Cal. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1954); Hill v. Estate of Westbrook, 95 Cal.App.2d 599, 602, 213 P.2d 727 (Cal. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1950). 153 Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S.Ct. 2472 (2003). 
154 Id. Overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), the Lawrence Court 
acknowledged that individual decisions concerning the intimacies of physical 
relationships are a form of liberty and hence, the Texas statute impinged on the exercise 
ofliberty interests protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
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the liberty interest affords substantial protection through the nation's 
laws and traditions to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their 
private lives in matters pertaining to sex. 
Constitutional privacy doctrine thus dictates state noninterference 
with adults' consensual sexual relationships, whether or not those 
relationships have been formalized through marriage. The repeal or 
non-enforcement of criminal statutes prohibiting consensual sex acts 
between adults155 that began in the late twentieth century and continued 
through the decision in Lawrence illustrates the state's gradual retreat 
from its historical role of policing and enforcing sexuality.IS6 The 
prevalence of nonmarital sex coupled with explicit judicial and 
I 55 Eight states continue to have sodomy laws in effect that apply to both opposite-sex 
and same-sex acts: Alabama, Florida, Idaho, Louisiana, North Carolina, South Carolina, 
Utah and Virginia. Also, only three states had same-sex sodomy statutes that had not 
been abolished either legislatively or by judicial pronouncement: Kansas, Oklahoma and 
Texas. See, WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & NAN D. HUNTER, SEXUALITY, GENDER, AND 
THELAW9-ll {2001 Supp.). 
Even before the Supreme Court's decision in Lawrence, many states had recognized the 
sexual privacy right by abolishing their sodomy statutes. See, e.g., Jegley v. Picado, 349 
Ark. 600 (2002) (holding that Arkansas's criminal sodomy statute, which applied only to 
same-sex couples, violated the state privacy and equal protection rights of same-sex 
couples engaging in private, consensual, noncommercial sexual activity); Doe v. 
Ventura, 2001 WL 543734 (Minn. May 15, 2001) (declaring sodomy law 
unconstitutional, with state trial court certifying a class action to give the ruling 
statewide effect); Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18 (Ga. 1998) (declaring state sodomy law 
unconstitutional); Gryczan v. Montana, 942 P.2d 112 (Mont. 1997) (declaring sodomy 
law unconstitutional as violation of state constitution's right to privacy); Campbell v. 
Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d 250 (Tenn. App. 1996) (declaring sodomy law unconstitutional 
on state constitutional privacy grounds); Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 
(Ky. 1992) (declaring sodomy law unconstitutional); Michigan Org. for Human Rights v. 
Kelley, N0.88-815820 CZ, slip op. at 12 (Wayne Cnty. Cir. Ct. 1990) (unpublished) (no 
appeal taken) (declaring sodomy laws unconstitutional as to "activities between 
consenting adults taking place in the privacy of one's home."). But see State v. Smith, 
766 So. 2d 501 (La. 2000) (upholding sodomy law that applies to both opposite-sex and 
same-sex acts); City of Topeka v. Movsovitz, 960 P.2d 267 (Kan. Ct. App. 1998) 
(upholding sodomy law that criminalizes only same-sex acts). 
The Court's decision in Lawrence, then, rather than breaking with majority popular 
opinion, reflects an extant belief in the privacy due adult sexual acts. As noted by 
Supreme Court Justice O'Connor in a collection of essays published shortly before the 
Court's decision in Lawrence came down, "rare indeed is the legal victory-in court or 
legislature-that is not a careful byproduct of an emerging social consensus." SANDRA 
DAY O'CONNOR, THE MAJESTY OF THE LAW 166 (Craig Joyce, ed. 2003). 
156 In his concurring opinion in Jegley v. Picado, 349 Ark. 600, 641 (2002), Justice 
Robert L. Brown, joined by Justice Jim Hannah, emphasized his agreement with the 
national trend "to curb government intrusions at the threshold of one's door and most 
definitely at the threshold of one's bedroom." !d. 
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legislative recogmt10n of sexual privacy threatens the privileging of 
marital sex and mitigates societal attempts to control sexuality. 157 
Like sex, procreation has long been considered to be one of the 
primary purposes of marriage. 158 The Supreme Court has described 
marriage as "basic to the perpetuation of a race" 159 and "fundamental to 
our very existence and survival."160 June Carbone notes that marriage 
could only be considered fundamental to our very existence if it were 
viewed as a necessary precondition to procreation.161 But, as with sex, 
there has been a growing acknowledgement of the notion that 
individuals should make procreative decisions free of government 
intervention. 
The state's role in policing procreation was more explicit in the past 
than it is today. Indeed, evidence suggests that prior to the second half 
of the 1900s, there was intense public and private pressure not to bear or 
157 This is not to imply, of course, that state recognition of sexual and procreative 
privacy is either complete or necessarily permanent. See, e.g., Partial-Birth Abortion 
Ban Act of 2003 18 U.S.C.A. §1531(b)(l)(A) (2003) (prohibiting intact dilation and 
extraction abortions); Editorial, The War Against Women, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2003, § 
4, at 14 (arguing that Bush administration's "anti-choice crusade"-its attempts to block 
women's access to contraceptives--constitutes an assault on reproductive rights that 
threatens women's constitutional liberty and denies them essential reproductive health 
care); Robin Toner, At a Distance, Bush Joins Abortion Protest, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 
2003, at Al6 (quoting President George W. Bush as telling thousands of abortion 
protesters that he shared their commitment to "protect the lives of innocent children 
waiting to be born."). 
158 Unlike state treatment of impotence, however, no state permits annulment of a 
marriage based on a spouse's infertility. See 24 AM. JUR. 2D Divorce & Separation § 
122 (2003) ("Inability to beget or bear children, if associated with complete power of 
coeulation, is not a ground for dissolving a marriage."). 
15 Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rei. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535,536 (1942). 
160 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). Until the mid-twentieth century, courts 
tended to treat marriage, sex, and procreation as virtually interchangeable. The courts 
knew, of course, that procreation was possible outside marriage. But these opinions 
illustrate the deeply-held social aversion to having children born to unmarried parents. A 
New York Court in 1926 stated, for example: 
[T]he refusal of husband or wife without any adequate excuse to have 
ordinary marriage relations with the other party to the contract strikes at 
the basic obligations springing from the marriage contract, when viewed 
from the standpoint of the State and of society at large. However much 
this relationship may be debased at times it nevertheless is the foundation 
upon which must rest the perpetuation of society and civilization. If it is 
not to be maintained we have the alternatives either of no children or of 
illegitimate children, and the State abhors either result. 
Mirizio v. Mirizio, 150 N.E. 605, 607 (N.Y. 1926). 
161 Carbone, supra note 5, at 274. 
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raise children outside of marriage. 162 In the late eighteenth century, 
common mechanisms of control included not only the legal impediments 
imposed on illegitimate children, 163 but also "shotgun" marriages, 
adoption, and even abortion. During this period, reports indicate that 
one out of three New England brides was pregnant at the time of 
marriage.164 These notions of state control of and regulation of the 
procreative process were briefly challenged in the mid-nineteenth 
century, when cornmunitarian and "free-love" alternatives were 
perceived to threaten traditional monogamy, as was the social instability 
caused by the massive casualties and upheaval of the Civil W ar. 165 Such 
rebellion was short-lived, however. The late nineteenth century 
witnessed a reactionary "moral panic" over family life, which led to 
concerted efforts to reinforce traditional marital mores.166 
The mid-twentieth century saw the beginnings of a heightened 
respect for reproductive privacy. In the first decision to explicitly 
articulate a fundamental right to privacy, the Supreme Court held in 
Griswold v. Connecticut that government had no place in the procreative 
decisions of married couples, invalidating a state law that criminalized 
the use of contraceptive devices. 167 Justice Douglas, writing for the 
Court, considered hypothetical enforcement measures under the law and 
found that "[t]he very idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy 
surrounding the marriage relationship."168 A few years later in 
Eisenstadt v. Baird, the Court extended Griswold to protect the 
162 GROSSBERG, supra note 5, at 196-201. 
163 /d. 
164 See Sylvia A. Law, supra note 145, at 184. 
165 Corr, supra note 78, at 105-31 ("Traditional monogamy appeared to need 
bolstering after the Civil War. Communitarian and free love alternatives had bedeviled 
the institution in the 1850s; then wartime disasters threatened known ways of life."). 
166 See, e.g .. GROSSBERG, supra note 5, at 83-84 ("In nineteenth-century American 
domestic relations, panics over family life led to persistent efforts to compel deviant 
couples to adhere to orthodox republican matrimonial practices."). Passage of the 
Comstock Act in 1873, for example, arose from a desire to confine sexuality to the 
marital relationship. The Act criminalized the use of the mails to circulate "obscene, 
lewd or lascivious" materials, which included articles intended "for preventing 
conception or producing abortion, or for indecent or immoral use." The law was 
interpreted to apply to the marketing of birth control devices. XVII U.S. STATUTES AT 
LARGE, 598-600 (George P. Sanger ed., 1873). Following the passage of the Comstock 
Act, approximately half of the states passed "little Comstock laws" making contraceptive 
devices illegal. See, GROSSBERG, supra note 5, at 175-78; COTI, Puauc Vows, supra 
note 78, at 124-25. 
167 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
168 /d. at 486. 
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procreative privacy of unmarried persons as well as married couples. In 
Eisenstadt169 the Court invalidated a Massachusetts law that made it a 
felony for anyone other than a physician or pharmacist to dispense 
contraceptives to unmarried persons. Justice Brennan, writing for the 
Court, reasoned simply that "whatever the rights of the individual to 
contraception may be, the rights must be the same for the married and 
unmarried alike."170 Thus, "[i]fthe right of privacy means anything, it is 
the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from 
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally 
affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child."171 
The state has therefore taken a number of steps to extricate itself 
from individuals' procreative decisions, within and outside of marriage. 
The elimination of legal distinctions between marital and nonmarital 
children, 172 the availability of contraceptives, 173 and access to 
abortion 174 all illustrate both the separation of procreation from marriage 
and the limited nature of the state's interest in those decisions. 175 
169 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1971). 
170 Id. at 453. 
171 Id. 
172 See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (permitting child of unmarried 
parents to inherit from father as well as mother, once paternity proven); Gomez v. Perez, 
409 U.S. 535 (1973) (imposing duty to support child on both unmarried parents, once 
paternity proven); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (holding unconstitutional a 
state's creating a cause of action in favor of a child of married parents for the wrongful 
death of a parent but excluding from the same cause of action a child born of unmarried 
parents). Beginning with Levy, the Supreme Court established an intermediate scrutiny 
standard to determine the constitutionality of statutes distinguishing between children of 
married and unmarried parents. See id. 
173 See, Griswold, 381 U.S. at 479 (striking down a Connecticut law criminalizing the 
distribution of contraceptives to married individuals); Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 454-55 
(striking down a Massachusetts law criminalizing the distribution of contraceptives to 
unmarried individuals). 
174 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (extending the right to privacy to 
include a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy); Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (holding 
unconstitutional the Pennsylvania requirement that a married woman seeking an abortion 
inform her husband of her intent and produce a signed statement that she has done so, 
but upholding a state's imposition of a 24-hour waiting period and parental notification 
provision with judicial bypass in same statute); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000) 
(holding unconstitutional a state statute prohibiting both dilation and evacuation and 
dilation and extraction abortion procedures). 
The federal government refuses to include abortion among the procedures covered by 
Medicaid, the federally subsidized health insurance program for the poor. See, e.g. , 
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (permitting an amendment to the federal Medicaid 
Act prohibiting use of Medicaid payments for non-therapeutic abortions); Webster v. 
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But some of the privacy guarantees afforded by constitutional 
privacy doctrine can be waived, and poor people who receive certain 
types of government assistance-the vast majority of whom are 
women 176-must do just that. The Supreme Court has held, for instance, 
that because families do not have a per se entitlement to government 
assistance, the government may require families receiving assistance to 
submit to inspection and state intervention in many intimate aspects of 
their family and private lives in order to qualify for benefits.177 
The 1996 Welfare legislation introduced a number of measures 
designed to modify poor women's sexual and reproductive behavior.178 
Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (upholding a state statute prohibiting 
any public employee from assisting in any abortion not necessary to save the mother' s 
life). 
l75 See Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 454-55. 
176 In 1997, 96.4 percent of welfare recipients were women with children. Pamela J. 
Loprest & Shelia R. Zedlewski, Current and Former Welfare Recipents: How Do They 
D.jffer?, Urban Institute Discussion Paper 99-17 at 3 (November 1999). 1 See, e.g., Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587 (1987) (upholding regulation under Aid 
to Families with Dependent Children welfare program determining families' eligibility 
for benefits despite negative effects on families' chosen living arrangements); Lyng v. 
Castillo, 477 U.S. 635 (1986) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to a provision in the 
federal food stamp program that presumed certain household members functioned as a 
single economic unit); Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971) (rejecting a welfare 
recipient's right to refuse a state home inspection as a condition of welfare eligibility). 
178 See generally Wendy Chavkin et al., Sex, Reproduction, and Welfare Reform, 7 
GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & PoL'Y 379 (2000), for review and criticism of the 1996 Act's 
efforts to modify sexual and reproductive behaviors through a series of economic 
disincentives. The authors argue that Family Cap Provisions (which prevent increases in 
assistance to mothers who bear additional children while already receiving welfare 
benefits) have no significant effect on childbearing. Other such policies have been 
similarly ineffective, including family planning mandates, abstinence education, and 
other policies aimed at decreasing nonmarital births. Instead of addressing the problem 
of poverty, the authors posit that these sorts of policies focus on individual sexual and 
reproductive behaviors in a manner that is both unethical and ineffective. 
In addition, in all states, women must identify the father (or potential father/fathers) of 
her children and cooperate with state child support collection efforts in order to establish 
or maintain eligibility for benefits. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act of 1996,42 U.S.C.A. §§ 601-617 (2004), Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 103, 
110 Stat. 2105, 2135 (1996). Every state, in order to comply with federal law, must enact 
legislation that makes cooperation with paternity identification and child support 
enforcement a condition of eligibility. Any state that fails to enact and enforce this 
requirement will lose up to five percent of its total block grant. I d. Sixteen states require 
that welfare recipients be given information to promote family planning (initiated by the 
state agency rather than the participant) or require that they attend family planning 
counseling sessions. IOWA CODE ANN.§ 2398.10 (6) (West 2000); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. 
§ 46:447.1 (West 2000); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 3788 (14) (West 2000); MD. 
CODE ANN. Art. 88A § 49(a)(4)(ii) (2000); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 118 § 1 (110)(I)(4)(i)-
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For example, to discourage poor women from having additional 
children, twenty-three states subject families to "family cap" measures. 
These measures reduce or eliminate any benefit increase for mothers 
who have additional children while on welfare.179 
The principles underlying constitutional privacy doctrine require that 
individuals be permitted to make procreative decisions free from 
government interference or coercion. Without the modest increase 
provided for additional family members, however, government 
implicitly regulates procreation among those receiving assistance 
because parents who do have additional children are forced to support 
their families at a level even further below the poverty line (at which the 
level of support is, by definition, inadequate). 180 The family cap 
threatens women who have additional children with even deeper 
(iv) (Law. Co-op. 2000); NEB. REV. STAT. § 68-1722 (2000); NEV. REV. STAT. 422.284 
(2000); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW§§ 350, 409-1 (McKinney 2000); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 
5107.72 (West 2000); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 43-5-24, 43-5-1120 (D) (Law. Co-op. 2000); 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 71-3-701 (2000); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 1106(7) (2000); VA. 
CODE ANN.§ 63.1-133.45 (Michie 2000); WASH. REv. CODE§ 74.12.400(4) (2000); W. 
VA. CODE§ 9-9-9 (2000); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 49.159, 49.19 (11 s)(d) (West 2000). 
Three states encourage poor women to relinquish their children for adoption. UTAH CODE 
ANN.§ 35A-3-308(4) (1997); VA. CODE ANN.§ 63.1-133.45 (Michie 1995); WASH. REV. 
CODE§§ 74.12.255(4), 74.04.005 (2001). 
179 ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 46-292 (West 2000); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE§ 
11450.04 (West 2001); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 17b-112 (West 2001); FLA. STAT. ch. 
414.115 (2000); GA. CODE ANN.§ 49-4-186 (2000); 305 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/4-2 (2000); 
MD. CODE ANN. Art. 88A §50 (2001); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 118, § 1 (Lexis Supp. 
2001); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-17-5 (1) (2000); NEB. REv. STAT. § 68-1724 (2)(b) (2000); 
N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 44:10-61 (West 2001); N.D. CENT. CODE§ 50-09-29 (2001); OKLA. 
STAT. tit. 56,§ 230.58 (2000); S.C. CODE ANN.§ 43-5-1175 (Law. Co-op. 2000); TENN. 
CODE ANN.§ 71-3-154 (I) (2000); VA. CODE ANN.§ 63.1-105.7 (Michie 2000); WIS. 
STAT. ANN.§ 49.19 (lls)(b) (West 2001); WYO. STAT. ANN.§ 42-2-103 (e)(iii) (Michie 
2001); ARK. DEPT. OF HUMAN SERVS., TRANSITIONAL EMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE 
MANUAL,§ 2150.1 (1999), available at 
http://www.state.ar.us/dhs/webpolicy!fEA%20Po1icy!fEA_TOC.htm; Del. Code Regs. 
§§ 8000, 8205.2, 8301.3; § 3008.2 DEL. Soc. SERVS. MANUAL§ 40-800-005 (2000); IND. 
ADMIN. CODE tit. 470, r. 14-2-2 (2000); N.C. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
NORTH CAROLINA'S T ANF STATE PLAN, Appendix Cat 26 (1999), available at 
h~://www.dhhs.state.nc.us/docs/wtp1an.pdf. 
18 In addition, Dorothy Roberts argues that these laws reflect "the view that 
childbearing by poor women is pathological and should be deterred through social 
policy." Dorothy Roberts, Welfare's Ban on Poor Motherhood, 152, 153, in WHOSE 
WELFARE? (Gwendolyn Mink ed. 1999). 
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poverty; its very purpose is to affect women's decisions to procreate. 
And only the poor are sanctioned in this manner. 181 
The state's focus on reducing nonmarital childbearing by women 
receiving public assistance is wrongheaded at best, unlawful at worst. 
The Supreme Court has extended constitutional protection to 
individuals' procreative decisions, and that protection should not be 
contingent on parents' and would-be parents' economic status. Efforts 
to reduce poor women's fertility subjects them, because of their poverty, 
to state intrusion that most of us would consider a violation of our 
privacy. 
In 1994, the United States, along with 179 other countries, signed 
the Programme of Action at the International Conference on Population 
and Development in Cairo, Egypt.182 That document states that 
reproductive rights include the individual's "right to make decisions 
concerning reproduction free of discrimination, coercion and 
violence."183 Yet the family cap and other measures instituted through 
welfare reform are nothing if not coercive. Dorothy Roberts has 
criticized many of the measures adopted as part of state welfare 
programs, noting that "[t]his degree of government control over 
reproductive decision-making would surely amount to a violation of 
citizens' procreative liberty if imposed directly by law. Protection from 
government intrusion of such deeply personal matters is ' [a]t the heart of 
liberty. "' 184 -
181 See, e.g., Anna Marie Smith, The Sexual Regulation Dimension of Contemporary 
Welfare Law: A Fifty State Overview, 8 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 121 , 175-76 (2002). 
Smith canvases the states' family cap provisions and concludes that: 
Welfare recipients are the only citizens who are penalized by the government on the 
basis of the number of their children . . . In other programs and taxation schemes, either 
the size and structure of the family is ignored altogether-as it is in the Social Security 
program-{)r parents are given additional benefits-such as taxation credits and tuition 
assistance packages-when they have more children. 
!d. 
182 UNITED NATIONS, INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE QN POPULATION AND 
DEVELOPMENT, REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON POPULATION AND 
DEVELOPMENT, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 171/13 (1994). 
183 /d. at43. 
184 Dorothy E. Roberts, Welfare and the Problem of Black Citizenship, 105 YALE L.J. 
1563, 1582 (1996) (reviewing LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED: SINGLE 
MOTHERS AND THE HISTORY OF WELFARE (1994) and JILL QUADAGNO, THE COLOR OF 
WELFARE: HOW RACISM UNDERMINED THE WAR ON POVERTY (1994)). Roberts has also 
suggested that, for African Americans, "social reproduction carries the added importance 
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Second, attempts to reduce nonmarital childbearing are not only 
wrongheaded, but also may well be doomed to fail. 185 Other policies 
aimed at decreasing nonmarital births have been feckless, including 
family planning mandates and abstinence education. 186 The question of 
effectiveness may remain open--Qne researcher acknowledges that 
family cap programs have so far eluded evaluation because of the 
complexities that come with the fact that they "were implemented at the 
same time as a broad set of other changes, any number of which could 
impact on fertility behavior."187 But there appears to be little reason to 
expect that such policies will be effective in any significant way. 
In general, while there has been some improvement in reducing non-
marital births in the 1990s, little of it can be attributed to welfare reform. 
Among African-Americans (who are disproportionately represented 
among welfare recipients), for instance, non-marital births dropped from 
90.5 per thousand in 1990 to 73.3 per thousand in 1998, a decline of 19 
percent. Almost all of the improvement, however, predated the 1996 
legislation. 188 
Government efforts to reduce childbearing by poor and unmarried 
women bespeaks a distrust of the poor and a hostility to deviant family 
forms, i.e., those without a male head of household. As Nancy Polikoff 
has observed: 
The imperative to find a legal father for every child provides 
a convenient smokescreen, a diversion of energy and 
resources from the possible solutions to children's real 
problems. Targeting single motherhood, therefore, serves 
the dual purpose of perpetuating patriarchal ideology and 
exonerating the state from its obligation to provide children 
of preserving cultural traditions under assault by the dominant society." Dorothy E. 
Roberts, Spiritual and Menial Housework, 9 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 51, 69-70 (1997). 
185 See, e.g., Chavkin et. al., supra note 178, (reviewing and criticizing the 1996 Act's 
efforts to modify sexual and reproductive behaviors through a series of economic 
disincentives). The authors argue that family cap provisions have no significant effect 
on childbearing. Instead of addressing the problem of poverty, the authors posit that 
these sorts of policies focus on individual sexual and reproductive behaviors in a manner 
that is both unethical and ineffective. /d. at 379. 
186 s d ee, e.g., l . at 380. 
187 Paul Offner, Reducing Non-Marital Births, in WELFARE REFORM AND BEYOND: 
THE FuruRE OF THE SAFETY NET 148 (Isabel V. Sawhill et al. eds. 2002). 
188 /d. at 149. 
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with at least minimally adequate financial well-being, health 
care, education and physical safety. 189 
355 
The trend in constitutional jurisprudence that treats individuals' 
sexual relationships and procreative decisions-within and outside of 
marriage-as deserving privacy is a correct one. For poor families, 
ensuring procreative freedom and privacy means assuring them that their 
procreative decisions will not have dire financial consequences for their 
families. Legislative policy that rolls back those protections for poor 
people runs counter to that goal. A better social policy would be one 
that respects adult sexual and procreative privacy and is grounded in the 
notion of civic responsibility for ensuring the welfare of all citizens. 
D. "In Sickness and in Health": The Caretaking Function of Marriage 
Society currently designates the nuclear, preferably marital, family 
as the social structure that supports child caretaking.190 Yet caretaking 
benefits not only those for whom care is provided, but also society 
generally. 191 Our political system aspires that its citizens be capable of 
participating in the political process. Similarly, our economic 
institutions require capable workers. The sick and elderly require care, 
and we expect that today's young people will provide physical care to us 
once we are elderly. We expect that they will be the future workers who 
will fund our social security accounts, produce the goods to which we 
have become accustomed, and fuel the economy upon which we rely. 192 
Children can meet society's high expectations of them only if they 
have been cared for while dependent; they must have received an 
appropriate upbringing, as well as an adequate education. 193 The 
189 Nancy D. Polikoff, The Deliberate Construction of Families Without Fathers: Is It 
an Option for Lesbian and Heterosexual Mothers?, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 375, 394 
~1996). 90 See, e.g., June Carbone, A Feminist Perspective on Divorce, 4 CHILD. & DIVORCE 
186 (1994). 
191 See Martha Albertson Fineman, The Nature of Dependencies and Welfare 
"Reform," 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 287 (1996). 
192 See Katharine B. Silbaugh, Accounting for Family Change, 89 GEO. L.J. 923,968-
69 (2001) (reviewing JUNE CARBONE, FROM PARTNERS TO PARENTS: THE SECOND 
REVOLUTION IN FAMILY LAW (2000) ). 
193 Dependents require caretaking. Martha Fineman has observed that "dependency is 
both inevitable and universal ... (It} is inevitably associated with infancy and often 
accompanies old age, illness, and many disabilities. Dependency is, therefore, a natural 
part of all human experience." Fineman, supra note 191, at 292. Society thus requires 
caretakers. And, to the extent that a caretaker is not paid (e.g., a mother taking care of 
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successes and failures of child caretaking thus redound to society as a 
whole. 
Despite the tremendous public interest in dependents' care and 
upbringing, the state's efforts to directly support dependent caretaking, 
irrespective of the family structure within which it occurs, have been 
anemic. The rhetorical importance placed on child caretaking in the 
U.S. stands in stark contrast to family support policies that are the 
stingiest in the industrial world. 194 The state countenances the virtual 
nonexistence of subsidized child care, 195 the absence of mandated paid 
parental leave, 196 and unsupportive or inflexible work schedules that 
threaten parents and other caretakers with job loss, thus jeopardizing 
their families' economic security.197 Other supportive programs, like 
those that would increase the length of the school day and year-both 
offering children additional educational opportunities and providing 
additional supervision for children during caretakers' work hours-have 
not been widely implemented. 
her child full-time), caretakers themselves (or, as Fineman calls them, "derivative 
de,pendents") require support. See FINEMAN, supra note 32, at 161-163. 
l9 See, e.g., STACEY, supra note 14, 46-48. 
195 The absence of universal childcare and early childhood education programs forces 
families, especially poor families, to spend an inordinately high percentage of their 
earnings on often inadequate childcare. Families with incomes below the poverty line 
spend a full 25% of their incomes on childcare. Families with incomes between 100% 
and 125% of the poverty line spend 16% of their incomes on childcare. And non-poor 
families spend, on average, 6% of their incomes on childcare. See JODY HEYMANN, THE 
WIDENING GAP: WHY AMERICA'S WORKING FAMILIES ARE IN JEOPARDY AND WHAT CAN 
BE DONE ABOUT IT 130 (2000). See also HEDIEH RAHMANOU, INST. FOR WOMEN'S 
POLICY RESEARCH, THE WIDENING GAP: A NEW BOOK ON THE STRUGGLE TO BALANCE 
WORK AND CAREGIVING, RESEARCH-IN BRIEF 3 (200 l ). 
196 The Family Medical Leave Act [hereinafter FMLA] requires that only employers 
with 50 or more workers provide them up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave upon the birth 
or adoption of a child. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2611, 2612(a) (2004). Approximately half of 
workers in the U.S. are not covered under FMLA because they work for employers with 
fewer than 50 workers, are part-time workers, or have recently changed jobs. COMM'N 
ON LEAVE, A WORKABLE BALANCE: REPORT TO CONGRESS ON FAMILY AND MEDICAL 
LEAVE PoLICIES, app. E, Table 5.H, 5.R (1996). Many families cannot afford to lose 
twelve (or even fewer) weeks of income. Only 2 percent of workers have paid family 
leave. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS IN MEDlliM AND LARGE 
PRIVATE ESTABLISHMENTS, 4 (1999). See generally, HEYMANN, supra note 195. 
197 Many workers in the U.S., especially low-income workers, do not have workforce 
benefits like paid leave or flexible work schedules that can make it economically feasible 
for workers to meet their caretaking obligations. Only 32 percent of low-income 
employees can choose their starting and quitting times. In that same group of low-
income employees, 71 percent are unable to take days off to care for sick children. See 
HEYMANN, supra note 195, at 116. 
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In contrast, other countries consistently do more to assist caretakers. 
France and the Scandinavian countries are among those that have 
implemented family support policies that directly support caretak:ing.198 
These policies include subsidized day care, paid parental leave, universal 
health care, and income supplements to low-earning caretakers. At least 
in part because of these measures, the child poverty rate in France, for 
example, is just over five percent, compared to nearly twenty percent in 
the U.S. 199 As Barbara Bergmann argues: 
What is different [between the U.S. and France] is not 
children's needs, but the sense of public responsibility for 
the welfare of the nation's children, the feelings of 
generosity toward those who are poor, the willingness to pay 
taxes . . . . [T]he United States is an extremely wealthy 
country, and one of the least taxed in the developed 
world ... . A costly and activist program is the only way we 
will be able to make progress against child poverty.200 
Certainly, some families in the U.S. may receive different types of 
support, depending on their family and caretaking structures. The state 
supports some dependents indirectly through the subsidies and supports 
provided to marital families, support that comes without 
stigmatization.201 Married couples receive more protections and benefits 
198 See BARBARA R. BERGMANN, SAVING OUR CHll..DREN FROM POVERTY: WHAT THE 
UNITED STATES CAN LEARN FROM FRANCE 117-119 ( 1996); STACEY, supra note 14, at 
45-48. 
199 BERGMANN, supra note 198, at 6. 
200 BERGMANN, supra note 199, at 118, 151. 
201 Despite its receipt of state subsidies, the myth of the "self~sufficient" and 
"independent" marital family is pervasive. When these families perform more 
successfully than other (unsubsidized) family forms, the myth is perpetuated. The fiction 
of the independent family "masks or distorts the universal and extensive nature of 
dependency in society. [These families'] subsidized existence solidifies the notion that 
successful families manage dependency without resorting to the state." Martha Fineman, 
Masking Dependency: The Political Role of Family Rhetoric, 81 VA. L. REv. 2181,2213 
(1995). 
In response to a request from Congress to "identify federal laws in which benefits, rights 
and privileges are contingent on marital status," the General Accounting Office 
conducted a search and identified "1049 federal laws classified to the United States Code 
in which marital status is a factor." General Accounting Office, Office of General 
Counsel, GAO/OGC-97-16, Defense of Marriage Act 1-2 (1997). 
Married couples benefit from favorable tax and inheritance laws and may receive 
pension benefits, derivative social security benefits (which provide income to surviving 
spouses of workers and veterans upon their deaths), derivative health insurance benefits, 
and Medicare benefits (which ensure the availability of health care to spouses of insured 
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than do nonmarital couples-social security, pension, and health 
insurance benefits are among the measures that assist marital families. 202 
While federal income tax laws currently require some two-earner marital 
families to pay higher taxes than if they were to file singly, they do 
benefit the family with one primary wage-earner and a stay-at-home 
dependent spouse (or secondary wage-eamer).203 Thus, while all marital 
individuals once the insured individuals reach age 62), as well as decision-making 
authority in the case of their spouse's disability. Upon marrying, couples also acquire, 
inter alia, property and inheritance rights, the right to spousal support, and the right to 
preserve the confidentiality of marital communications. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 
44, 59 (Hawaii 1993) (offering a partial list of marital rights and benefits). See also 38 
U.S.C. §1311 (Westlaw 2003); 42 U.S.C . §402 (Westlaw 2003); Nancy J . Knauer, 
Heteronormativity and Federal Tax Policy, 101 W.VA. L. REv. 129, 130-139, 143-184 
(1998). See generally infra notes 202-208 and accompanying text. 
Couples excluded from marriage rank the ability to file joint federal income tax returns 
as one of the most significant benefits denied them; in "a same-sex couple where one 
partner has considerably more income than the other, the inability to file jointly will 
result in greater tax liability than a similarly situated married couple." Knauer, supra, at 
165. See also I.R.C . § 6013 (Westlaw 2003). Other tax benefits provided to marital 
couples include employer-provided fringe benefits, including health insurance, and 
group-term life insurance; these are doubly tax-advantaged because of their exclusion 
from an employee's gross income. Knauer, supra, at 169. See also I.R.C. §§ 106, 152 
(Westlaw 2003). Married taxpayers also receive an unlimited deduction for inter vivos 
and testamentary transfers to a spouse. I.R.C. §§ 2053, 2056 (Westlaw 2003). This 
gives married taxpayers a way to escape transfer tax liability and allows married couples 
to engage in non-tax estate planning without transfer tax consequences. See Knauer, 
supra, at 173. But see supra note 7 for discussion of marriage penalty that affects some 
married couples. 
See also Dee Ann Habegger, Living in Sin and the Law: Benefits for Unmarried Couples 
Dependent upon Sexual Orientation?, 33 IND. L. REv. 991,991-995 (2000); William V. 
Vetter, Restrictions on Equal Treatment of Unmarried Domestic Partners, 5 B.U. Pus. 
INT. L.J. I, 1-9 {1995); Christine Jax, Same-Sex Marriage- Why Not?, 4 WIDENER J. 
PuB. L. 461, 463-465 ( 1995). See generally Unmarried America, Unmarried Americans 
Question Unfairness in Federal Tax Laws, available at 
http://www.unmarriedamerica.com/taxeslbrochure I.htm (last visited March 17, 2004), 
(describing many of the same tax and social security benefits extended to married 
ta¥ayers, but not to singles or same-sex or unmarried couples). 
20 See supra note 20 1. 
203 This benefit results from the effective splitting of income between the spouses. 
The individual wage earner's income is thus taxed at a lower rate. The caretaking and 
domestic services provided by the stay-at-home spouse, moreover, go untaxed. See, e.g., 
Mrujorie Kornhauser, Love, Money and the IRS: Family, Income-Sharing, and the Joint 
Income Tax Return, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 63,64 (1993); Edward J. McCaffery, Taxation and 
the Family: A Fresh Look at Behavioral Gender Biases in the Code, 40 UCLA L. REv. 
983,988-\034 (\992) (surveying the relevant tax laws and the behavioral incentives the 
foster within marriages); Michael J. Mcintyre & Oliver Oldman, Taxation of the Family 
in a Comprehensive and Simplified Income Tax, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1573, 1627 {1977) 
(comparing joint- and single-return tax burdens on family income). 
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families arguably receive significant net benefits by marrying, the so-
called traditional family is rewarded further. Society also privileges and 
supports marital families in numerous direct and indirect ways. 204 
Across the United States, unmarried men and women who live 
together are almost as likely to be raising children as are married 
couples. 205 But because they have chosen not to formalize their 
relationships, they must manage caretaking without many of the benefits 
accorded marital families. Also, social support for single-parent 
families, the vast majority of which are headed by women, can vary 
dramatically based on the way in which those families were originally 
formed. Widows, for example, typically received generous and non-
stigmatized social security benefits.Z06 Divorced and never-married 
mothers must depend instead on the vicissitudes of the uncertain child 
support207 and welfare systems. 208 Not only are these families affected 
materially, but they also suffer from a social stigma that is reinforced by 
the existing legal structure. 
Some commentators retort that two-parent marital families are best 
for children, so it is therefore appropriate for the state to subsidize or 
privilege this family form over others.209 There are several problems 
204 See FINEMAN, supra note 32, at 226. 
205 Forty-three percent of unmarried, cohabiting couples are raising children, just 
slightly less than the 46 percent of married couples raising children. And while the trend 
is rising for unmarried couples, it is becoming less common for married couples to have 
children living with them. D'Vera Cohn, Live-Ins Almost as Likely as Marrieds to be 
Parents; Census Also Looks at Gay Households. WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 2003, at A I. 
206 The surviving spouse of an insured worker caring for a child under 16 may receive 
75 percent of the amount the worker would have received had he or she retired. Once 
the surviving spouse turns 60, he or she may receive I 00 percent of the amount the 
worker would have received through the Social Security system. See Mary E. 
O'Connell, On the Fringe: Rethinking the Link Between Wages and Benefits, 61 TUL. L. 
REv. I42I, I48I (1993). 
207 Just over half of eligible caretakers receive orders of support;most of them are 
divorced mothers. A significant proportion of those who have such orders do not receive 
payments or only receive partial payments. See Irwin Garfinkel & Patrick Wong, Child 
Support and Public Policy, in LONE-PARENT FAMILIES: THE ECONOMIC CHALLENGE IOl, 
I02-03 (Elizabeth Duskin ed., I990). 
208 Most states provide welfare benefits (combining cash benefits, Medicaid and food 
stamps) that add up to only 70 percent of the federal poverty level. Yet a minimum wage 
job is insufficient to replace welfare benefits and involves associated expenses 
(transportation, clothing, etc.). See STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 
OVERVIEW OF ENTITLEMENT PROGRAMS, 636-37 (Comm. Print 1992). 
209 See. e.g.. William Galston, The Reinstitutionalization of Marriage: Political 
Theory and Public Policy, in PROMISES TO KEEP: DECLINE AND RENEWAL OF MARRIAGE 
IN AMERJCA 27I, 272-276, 282-289 (David Popenoe et al. eds., 1996) (discussing the 
360 Virginia Journal of Social Policy & the Law [Vol. 11:3 
with this argument. First, the empirical data is often more complicated 
than these advocates suggest. Well-regarded sociologist Sara 
McLanahan210 has found that data does not support the conclusion that 
what harms children is the absence of one parent. Instead, McLanahan 
says, single parenting currently leads to certain types of instability that 
can harm children.211 Much of the link between single parenting and 
negative child outcomes can thus be attributed to low income, less-stable 
adult presence, and residential mobility after divorce. Other researchers 
have conducted subsequent studies that have refined McLanahan's 
findings further; these studies suggest that a decline in parenting begins 
pre-divorce in intact, but conflicted families, and may continue for a 
period of time post-divorce.212 Other commentators, moreover, have 
highlighted the danger in isolating a single variable to identify the cause 
of social phenomena.21 3 Single parenthood, for example, is not evenly 
distributed across society, but instead correlates with other 
socioeconomic factors. It is therefore difficult to pinpoint the effects of 
single parenthood on children. 214 
civic functions performed by the two-parent family, as well as the economic, cultural and 
legal factors necessary to foster and encourage that species of familial organization). See 
generally David Blankenhorn, FA TifERLESS AMERICA: CONFRONTING OUR MOST URGENT 
SOCIAL PROBLEM 1-5 (1995) (describing "fatherlessness" as the most harmful 
demographic trend confronting the current generation). 
210 See Katharine B. Silbaugh, Accounting for Family Change, 89 GEO. L.J. 923, 942 
~2001). 
II See SARA S. MCLANAHAN & GARY SANDEFUR, GROWING UP WITH A SINGLE 
PARENT: WHAT HURTS, WHAT HELPS 3-4 (1994). For example, other studies have found 
compelling evidence that a father's absence harms children because of the reduced 
income to the household. See, e.g., URBAN INSTITUTE, CHILD SUPPORT AND CHILD WELL-
BEING 1 (I. Garfinkel, S.S. McLanahan, & P.K. Robins eds., 1994). Findings on other 
ways in which paternal absence may harm children have been much Jess definitive. See, 
e.g., Paul R. Amato & Joan G. Gilbreth, Nonresident Fathers and Children's Well-being: 
A Meta-Analysis, 61 J. OF MARRIAGE & FAMILY 557, 557-73 (1999); Valerie King, 
Variation in the Consequences of Nonresident Father Involvement for Children's Well-
Being, 56 J. OF MARRIAGE & FAMILY 963, 963-72 (1994). See generally Suzanne M . 
Bianchi, Maternal Employment and Time with Children: Dramatic Change or Surprising 
Continuity?, 37 DEMOGRAPHY 401 (2000). 
212 See, e.g., PAUL R . AMATO & ALAN BOOTH, A GENERATION AT RISK 71-73 (1997); 
cf Andrew Cherlin et. al., Effects of Parental Divorce on Mental Health Through the 
L{{e Course, 63 AM. Soc. REv. 239,239-40 (1998). 
2 3 See, e.g., Carbone, supra note 19, at 111-122 (surveying contemporary research). 
Carbone notes that nonmarital births occur disproportionately among those already 
disadvantaged by income and race. See id. at ll9. 
214 See, e.g., id. at 80-84. Those who are single parents tend to come from groups 
already disadvantaged economically and in other ways (age, race, etc.). !d. at 119-122. 
Furthermore, poverty negatively affects parents' psychological well-being and the 
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The bottom line is that the data supporting arguments that two-
parent families are inherently superior to others is not overwhelming. 
Moreover, even if children derive some benefits from being reared in 
two-parent families, privileging those families is the wrong 
governmental response for several reasons. First, it is not at all clear that 
the marginal benefits to children from living in two-parent families 
outweigh the intrusion into adults' private intimate lives wrought by pro-
marriage policies. Second, prior to resorting to such intrusions, the state 
should attempt to neutralize any disadvantages of the single-parent 
household by implementing programs that directly support caretaking 
efforts. 
Another consideration is that policies that privilege marital families 
over others ignore some of the negative consequences that the traditional 
family form has had on many women. Within most families, women do 
the lion's share of the caretaking work, whether they work outside the 
home or not.215 Childrearing has been viewed as a female occupation 
since the mid-nineteenth century.216 While much of the overt rhetoric of 
domesticity and of the separate spheres of home and market has faded, 
the idealization of the mother-child bond continues. Pregnancy, 
childbearing, and nursing are biological functions that may be 
distinguished from childrearing. But their mystification helps perpetuate 
what some argue is a stubborn dual myth: women are 'naturally' suited 
for caretaking or childrearing, while men are not.217 Lifelong 
socialization and explicit external influences have together pressured 
parent-child relationship. For example, poverty is associated with greater parental 
anxiety, emotional stress, and harsher and more inconsistent punishment of children. See 
Nancy E. Dowd, Stigmatizing Single Parents, 18 Harv. Women's L.J. 19, 32-34 (1995). 
215 Studies comparing the amount of time that men and women spend parenting 
consistently show that women perform more hours of childcare than men, although the 
data conflict on how large the differential actually is. For analysis and discussion of the 
data, see Amy L. Wax, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Market: Is There a Future for 
Egalitarian Marriage? 84 VA. L. REv. 509, 519-24 (1998). In addition, men take less 
parental leave from the workplace (even when flexible work and leave policies are 
available and men are equally entitled to take leave to care for family members) to spend 
time with their families. ARLIE R. HOCHSCHILD, THE TiME BIND: WHEN WORK BECOMES 
HOME AND HOME BECOMES WORK 131 (1997). It remains the case that women are much 
more likely than men to interrupt their work to care for children. See Naomi Cahn, The 
Power of Caretaking, 12 YALE J.L. & FEMINISIM 177, 185-86 (2000). See also Bianchi, 
supra note 211; Karen Czapanskiy, Volunteers and Draftees: The Struggle for Parental 
Ef{,uality, 38 UCLA L. REv. 1415 (1991). 
21 See Cahn, supra note 215, at 189. 
217 See, e.g., !d. at 198 (arguing that because women's only dominion has historically 
been over children, they have become associated with this power). 
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mothers to shoulder a disproportionate share of the burdens (as well as 
receive a disproportionate share of the joys and benefits) of childrearing. 
For example, despite data suggesting that children in good daycare 
thrive, a majority of people polled believe nonetheless that preschool-
aged children suffer when their mothers work outside the home.218 In 
part because this idealized caretaking structure presumes a male primary 
breadwinner to financially support the household, its continued support 
by government perpetuates patriarchal familial norms. 
As discussed elsewhere in this Article, there are compelling reasons 
for the state to refrain from intervening in or distorting the expressive, 
companionate, and sexual/procreative aspects of adults' intimate 
choices.219 The nature of the public interest in dependent caretaking, 
however, is quite distinct. Given society's overwhelming interest in the 
well-being and development of all child dependents, a better policy than 
one that promotes marriage is one that directly supports all children. 
Since we should value all children equally, it is irrational for policies to 
privilege some and stigmatize others based on the structure of the family 
in which they are raised. We must take public responsibility for 
ensuring caretaking, and this responsibility does require government 
intervention. 
E. "For Richer, For Poorer": The Economic Function of Marriage 
In addition to being a relationship premised on affection and 
emotional commitment between partners, marriage is also an economic 
institution. Marriages are the locus for economic support of dependents 
in what is can be seen as a privatized system of wealth redistribution. 
The family's caretaking and economic functions are thus closely related. 
Economic support is essential to caretaking; the economic well-being of 
all its child dependents, therefore, should be of primary concern to the 
state. 
The normative modern marriage is an economic partnership built on 
sharing principles.220 The couple jointly makes investment decisions in 
career assets and human capital that ultimately benefit the marital family 
218 See DAPHNE SPAIN & SUZANNE M. BIANCHI, BALANCING AcT: MOTHERHOOD, 
MARRIAGE, AND EMPLOYMENT AMONG AMERICAN WOMEN 182-83 (1996). 
219 s d ee supra Parts liLA., III.B., an III.C. 
220 See, e.g., GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY 15-37 (1981) (first raising 
the economic model of the division oflabor in the two-spouse family). 
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as a whole. 221 In its most conventional manifestation, of course, the 
economic vision of marriage is one in which the husband earns a wage 
outside the home that is sufficient to support himself, his wife (who does 
not earn a wage outside the home), and their children. 222 Gary Becker 
and other economists have attempted to justify this model of marriage by 
arguing that positive efficiencies result from this sort of specialization of 
labor.223 
The normative vision of the economic function of marriage in the 
U.S. can be traced to the colonial period. American colonists brought 
with them from England marital and property systems that were feudal 
in origin. 224 English marriage law, consistent with property rules, 
treated married couples as a single legal entity; under the doctrine of 
coverture, a woman ceased to exist as a distinct legal person upon 
marrying and her legal persona became subsumed into that of her 
husband.225 The legal unity of husband and wife suited early American 
221 See Jana B. Singer, Divorce Reform and Gender Justice, 61 N.C. L. REv. 1103, 
1115 (1989). Much economic analysis examines family life as a process of exchange. 
Exchange theory preswnes that members of a household will interact the way that 
strangers do in the marketplace-contracting around allocations of resources, negotiating 
and making deals to increase one's own personal utility or happiness. Yet economists 
have begun to examine the role of altruism, considered a distinctive characteristic of 
family economic behavior. Nonetheless, while altruism complicates models of exchange 
within the family, Ann Estin argues that it does not replace the exchange theory of 
behavior, which is ultimately rational and self-interested. See Ann Laquer Estin, Love 
and Obligation: Family Law and the Romance of Economics, 36 WM. & MARY L. REv. 
989, 1013-1016 (1995). 
222 See supra notes 18-27 and accompanying text 
223 See discussion supra, Part ll.A., and text accompanying notes 18-30. June 
Carbone has suggested that Becker's theories be updated to reflect the fact that women's 
workforce participation actually leads to greater specialization among women. 
CARBONE, supra note 102, at 16, 17. This specialization not only increases overall 
wealth but also may give women greater ability to choose family forms, including more 
egalitarian marriages or no marriage at all. 
2Z4 These systems arose from the need in thirteenth-century feudal England to keep 
landed estates intact under the authority of a single member of the next generation. See 
generally Lee E. Teitelbaum, Family History and Family Law, 1985 WIS. L. REv. 1135 
(discussing interpretations of nineteenth-century family history); See also Charles 
Donohue, What Causes Fundamental Legal Ideas? Marital Property in England and 
France in the Thirteenth Century, 78 MICH. L. REv. 59, 60 (1979). 
225 Unmarried women had limited rights of inheritance and could not vote, serve on 
juries, or hold public office. They nonetheless had some legal capacity: women could 
hold property, enter into contracts, and sue or be sued. However, upon marrying, women 
lost these privileges, and could no longer enter into contracts, sue or be sued, or make 
wills. During their marriage, a woman's husband had legal authority to control his 
wife's land and to use any profits accruing from the property. See Homer H. Clark, Jr., 
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agrarian society, as farming made marriage an economic enterprise in 
which husband and wife were interdependent. 226 But while, married 
couples lived and worked together, the husband was the undisputed head 
of both the domestic and commercial spheres. This hierarchy was 
justified both by the ideology of the inherent inferiority of women and 
the economic reality of the husband's control of the family's income-
producing assets. 227 Industrialization, the effects of which were being 
felt in the eastern United States in the early part of the nineteenth 
century, severed the commercial and domestic spheres and precipitated a 
redefinition of gender roles. Men joined the sphere of the marketplace 
and the factory, while women were assigned almost exclusively to the 
domestic sphere.228 
During World War II, when large numbers of men were deployed 
overseas, many women took up their places in factories across America. 
The post-World War II years saw the end of the Industrial Age and the 
beginning of a "post-industrial" economy, when the heavy 
manufacturing and agricultural production that characterized 
industrialism were displaced by service and light industry 
employment.229 With men nearly fully employed, many middle-class 
women supplied labor to meet the increased demand.230 But even when 
both the husband and wife worked outside the house, they typically 
THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 286-87 (2d. ed. 1988). See 
also Joan C. Williams, Married Women and Property, I VA. J. Soc. PoL' Y & L. 383, 
385-86 (1994); June R. Carbone & Margaret F. Brinig, Rethinking Marriage: Feminist 
Ideology, Economic Change, and Divorce Reform, 65 TUL. L. REv. 953, 970 (1991) 
(discussing the nineteenth-century legal reforms in the United States that altered the 
conception of a married women's economic rights). 
226 The family household as a whole-not the primary or exclusive wage-earner-was 
the basic unit of economic production. ELI ZARETSKY, CAPITALISM, THE FAMILY, & 
PERSONAL LIFE 28-29 (1976). 
227 See ANTONIA FRASER, THE WEAKER VESSEL: WOMAN'S LOT IN SEVENTEENTH-
CENTURY ENGLAND 1-6 (1984); NANCY COTT, THE BONDS OF WOMANHOOD: 'WOMAN'S 
SPHERE' IN NEW ENGLAND, 1780-1835,201-04 (1977). 
228 See Frances Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal 
Reform, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1497, 1499-1501 (1983). As of 1890, only five percent of 
married women were employed outside the home. LYNN Y. WEINER, FROM WORKING 
GIRL TO WORKING MOTHER 6 (1985). 
229 See VICTOR R. FUCHS, WOMEN'S QUEST FOR ECONOMIC EQUALITY 24-25 (1988); 
MARY P. RYAN, WOMANHOOD IN AMERICA 313-331 (1975). 
230 See FUCHS, supra at 15; Paula England & George Farkas, HOUSEHOLDS, 
EMPLOYMENT, AND GENDER 137-45 (1986). June R. Carbone & Margaret F. Brinig, 
Rethinking Marriage: Feminist Ideology, Economic Change, and Divorce Reform, 65 
TUL. L. REv. 953,972-74 (1991). 
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assigned only one partner (usually the husband) to focus on the 
workplace and maximize his income.231 The second partner (usually the 
wife) took primary responsibility for dependent caretaking and 
subordinated her work obligations to meet the needs of her family and 
children.232 Even today, most couples continue to give higher priority to 
the husband's career, while women remain far more likely than men to 
sacrifice their market potential in order to benefit their children and 
families. 233 Research has shown that much of the pay gap between men 
and women can be attributed to their different caregiving roles.234 Joan 
Williams has concluded that: 
[t]he key gender shift between the domesticity/wage labor gender 
system and the contemporary system is not ... a shift from dependent to 
independent wives. Instead, the key shift is from wives totally cut off 
from market resources to wives who are secondary workers with careers 
subordinated to both their husbands' and their children's ... needs.235 
As their earning capacity decreases, many married women become 
increasingly dependent on their husbands. Intact marriages can mask 
this dependency. When marriages fail (as nearly half of all marriages 
do), however, those women frequently must become primary earners in 
an economy where a single wage-earner with few market skills 
frequently cannot earn enough to support herself and two children. 
Former husbands are often unwilling or unable to support two 
households.236 Thus, while nearly eighty percent of single mothers 
work, their employment often does not translate into economic self-
sufficiency. Barriers to single-parent families' economic well-being 
include low wages and continuing job segregation,237 expensive child 
care, and lack of employer-provided health insurance and other 
benefits.238 Many women and their children transfer their dependency 
from their husbands and fathers (while marriages are intact) to the state 
231 See Singer, supra note 221, at 1115. 
232 !d. 
233 See Singer, supra note 221, at 1115. 
234 See HEYMANN, supra note 195, at 147-159. 
235 Joan Williams, Women and Property, in A PROPERTY ANTHOLOGY 182, 184 
(Richard H. Chused, ed., 1992). 
236 STAFF OF HOUSE COMMITIEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, supra note 208, at 725. 
237 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, WHO CARES FOR AMERICA'S CHILDREN 26 (1990). 
See also Smith, supra note 181, at 135 n. 62. 
238 See Nancy E. Dowd, Family Values and Valuing Family: A Blueprint for Family 
Leave, 30 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 355, 359-62 (1993). 
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(after dissolution of their marriages). More than a third of all welfare 
recipients are divorced mothers and their children. 239 
Encouraging marriage is suggested as good economic policy240 
based in part on statistics that demonstrate that married couples are less 
likely to be poor than are single parents.241 It nearly goes without saying 
that correlation does not necessarily imply causation, but some 
researchers nonetheless tum the covariation of female-headed families 
and poverty into a causal relationship by ignoring the other social forces 
that contribute to this phenomenon. Marriage promotion measures fail 
to address economic circumstances that result in poverty. Faced with 
data that the U.S. has more poverty than any other major advanced 
nation,242 rather than attempting to limit the number of children born to 
women receiving aid, government should focus instead on addressing 
the extreme income inequality and poverty in the country. 243 
239 Loprest & Zedlewski, supra note 176 at 3. 
240 See, e.g .• Adam Thomas & Isabel Sawhill, For Richer or for Poorer: Marriage as 
an Antipoverty Strategy, 21-4 ]. POL. ANALYSIS & MGMT. 587, 597 {2002) {"[Our] 
analyses suggest that policies designed to engender marriage among single parents could 
have a considerable impact on child poverty."); Wade F. Hom, Wedding Bell Blues: 
Marriage and Welfare Reform, 19-3 BROOKINGS REv. 39, 39-42 (2001) ("Why haven't 
states made more progress in encouraging marriage as one way to reduce welfare 
dependency?"); Galston, supra note 209, at 275 ("These data suggest that the best anti-
~overty program for America's children is a stable, intact family."). 
41 See. e.g .• Norval D. Glenn et al.. Why Marriage Matters: Twenty-One Conclusions 
fjom the Social Sciences, AM. EXPERIMENT Q., Spring 2002, at 34, 38. 
242 See generally Paul Krugman, For Richer: How the Permissive Capitalism of the 
Boom Destroyed American Equality, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Oct. 20, 2002, at 62. 
Sweden, for example, has a per capita G.D.P. roughly comparable with that of 
Mississippi. However, the poorest Swedish families with children-those in the lOth 
percentile-have incomes that are 60 percent higher than their counterparts in the U.S. 
I d. at 76. Further, the median Swedish family has a standard of living comparable with 
that of median U.S. families. Krugman notes that "because so much of our national 
income is concentrated in relatively few hands, large numbers of Americans are worse 
off economically than their counterparts in other advanced countries." !d. America has 
higher per capita income than other advanced countries, but Krugman holds that to be 
primarily because our rich are much richer. I d. at 67. 
See also. Edward N. Wolff, The Economic Status of Parents in Postwar America, 59, 81, 
in TAKING PARENTING PUBLIC: THE CASE FOR A NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENT (Hewlett, 
Rankin, & West, eds. 2002) ("[l]n comparison with other advanced economies, the 
United States has by far the highest poverty incidence among children after the effects of 
~overnment transfer programs are accounted for."). 
43 See Krugman supra note 242 at 67. In 1998, according to Krugman, the 13,000 
richest families in the U.S. had nearly as much income as the 20 million poorest 
households. !d. at 65. 
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Government's efforts to have poor women marry men to help 
support them presumes that there is a pool of marriageable (i.e., 
employed, financially stable) men available to them.244 Studies have 
shown, however, that even if they were to marry and work in the 
marketplace, most poor women would remain poor or near-poor.245 In 
fact, marriage can actually reduce the well-being of low-income mothers 
if a potential spouse cannot contribute to the economic viability of the 
household.246 Indeed, declining labor opportunities for low-skilled men 
have mirrored decreases in marriage rates in low-income 
communities. 247 In the words of one low-income woman: 
[After the baby was bom,] everything started blowing up. I 
didn't [want to] be with him no more 'cause he wasn't 
working and he was getting on my nerves ... He just never 
gave me no money. I would tell him, you know, 'Well, the 
baby needs diapers.' 'Well, I don't have no money.' 'The 
baby needs milk.' 'Well, I don't have no money.' I just 
started getting mad. I had to buy milk and diapers so I just 
told him to leave me alone. 248 
244 But see Michael Tanner, Editorial, Wedded to Poverty, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2003, 
at A23. Tanner reports studies that have shown that there are relatively few 
"marriageable" men in high-poverty areas of the country. One such study found that 
more than one-third of fathers of nonmarital children lacked a high school degree; 28 
percent were unemployed; 20 percent had annual incomes under $6,000; and roughly 38 
percent had criminal records. Id. Tanner suggests that "many single mothers are single 
because they fmd their unemployed and under-educated potential partners to be 
unattractive marriage material. Do we really want to encourage them to marry 
unsuitable partners?" Id. 
245 See Wendy Sigle-Rushton and Sara McClanahan, For Richer or Poorer? Marriage 
as an Anti-Poverty Strategy in the United States, 57 POPULATION 509, 509 (2003), 
available at http://crcw.princeton.edu/workingpapers/WPOl-17-FF-Sigle.pdf. 
246 See Avis Jones-DeWeever, Marriage Promotion and Low-Income Communities: 
An Examination of Real Needs and Real Solutions, INST. FOR WOMEN'S POL. REs. 2 
(2002); Kathryn Edin, Few Good Men: Why Poor Women Don 't Remarry, THE 
AMERICAN PROSPECT, Jan. 3, 2000, at 262); Robin Jarrett, Welfare Stigma Among Low-
Income, African American Single Mothers, 45 FAMILY RELATIONS 368-74 (1996). 
247 See Francine D. Blau et al., Understanding Young Women 's Marriage Decisions: 
The Role of Labor and Marriage Market Conditions, 53 INDUS. & LAB. RL TNS. REv. 624 
~2000), available at http://papers.nber.org/papers/w7510.pdf. 
48 An African-American mother living in the Philadelphia metropolitan area, 
interview excerpted in Edin, supra note 246. 
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It is not at all certain that marriage is the antidote to poverty for 
many families. 249 Moreover, the state's focus on marriage as the 
ultimate solution permits society, at least to a degree, to comfortably 
blame poverty on the poor-specifically poor unmarried women. The 
focus on the red herring of marriage creates a culture of decreasing 
public responsibility and diverts attention from the state's failures in 
helping to ensure that dependents are cared for. Rather than focusing 
attention of marriage as the solution, what is needed are programs that 
lessen some of the most significant barriers to families' economic well-
being.250 
CONCLUSION 
Dependent caretaking is critical to the development of an educated, 
productive populace. Economic support and well-being is essential to 
dependent caretaking. The public interest in those functions-as they 
are performed both within and outside of marriage-therefore compels 
some degree of government involvement. However, using marriage as a 
proxy for these two, closely related functions is ham-handed. 
Regulating marriage means regulating areas in which the state should 
remain uninvolved-namely, the expressive, companionate, and sexual 
and procreative aspects of the marital and other intimate relationships. 
Rather than emphasizing the importance of marriage, government should 
instead enact more carefully targeted policies to support caretaking and 
the economic well-being of its citizenry. 
249 See, e.g., Alex Kotlowitz, Editorial, It Takes a Wedding, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 
2002, at A29. In an anecdotal report, Kotlowitz writes about eight unmarried couples 
who lived in public housing in Chicago. The couples were offered all-expenses-paid 
weddings and honeymoons. Most of the couples subsequently split up. Kotlowitz 
writes: 
/d. 
The stress of not having money, of living in decrepit housing, of sending 
children to poorly funded schools would take its toll on even the most 
committed relationship. So how then might we help get couples to the 
altar? By pushing marriage? Or by helping ease the strains in people's 
lives? 
250 Studies have shown that mothers' increased market work has not decreased the 
quality, and perhaps not even the quantity, of time women spend with their children. See 
Suzanne M. Bianchi, Maternal Employment and Time with Children: Dramatic Change 
or Surprising Continuity? 37 DEMOGRAPHY, 40l, 403 (2000). Bianchi argues that we 
have overestimated the amount of maternal time spent with children in the past and 
failed to appreciate how much working mothers do to protect the time spent with 
children. /d. 
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What would this look like in practice? First, the state would 
deemphasize family form. It would eliminate government-sanctioned 
privileges that currently accompany heterosexual monogamous marriage 
and that devalue and stigmatize other family structures. It would also 
introduce programs that directly bolster dependent caretaking and the 
economic supports that make such caretaking possible. Of course, some 
ofthese programs would be costly. Yet it is lack of political will, rather 
than economic inability, that currently prevents these programs from 
being adopted in the U.S.251 Possible programs could include subsidized 
or public day care, longer school days and school years, more affordable 
health care,252 and workplace protections (including paid family leave 
policies and flexible schedules253). To further ensure the economic 
security of dependents, the state should also make modifications to the 
welfare, social security, and tax systems. These could include 
combining the welfare and social security systems into a single system 
that ensures that dependents and their caretakers receive an level of 
support and increasing child tax credits for caretakers.254 In reviewing 
these proposals, it should be kept in mind that while they may sound 
251 Matthew Miller, a former budget aide in the Clinton White House, has recently 
proposed that government devote 2% of the U.S. gross domestic product, approximately 
$220 billion, to alleviate some of the country's most entrenched social problems. Miller 
suggests reprioritizing budget expenditures to provide universal health coverage, 
stabilize the Social Security system, better fund public education systems in inner cities, 
and ensure a living wage for the working poor. MA TIHEW MILLER, THE Two PERCENT 
SOLUTION: FIXING AMERICA'S PROBLEMS IN WAYS THAT LIBERALS AND CONSERVATIVES 
CAN LOVE ix-xv, 69-219 (2003). I note Miller's proposal to illustrate the potential 
economic feasibility of even ambitious social programs. 252 See, e.g., Ted Halstead, Editorial, To Guarantee Universal Coverage, Require It, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2003, at A29. Halstead proposes that the federal government 
implement mandatory self-insurance to provide fully portable coverage to all Americans. 
Those who could not afford to self-insure would be subsidized, and the separate 
Medicaid system for those who are poor would be eliminated. Halstead argues that such 
a system would lower insurance costs, raise the quality of care, maintain a private 
insurance market, and offer citizens more choice. !d. 
253 Studies in other countries have shown that leave policies covering childbirth and 
infant care significantly increase mothers' return to work. See Marit Ronsen & Marianne 
Sundstrom, Marital Employment in Scandinavia: A Comparison of the After-Birth 
Employment Activity of Norwegian and Swedish Women, 9 J. OF POPULATION 
ECONOMICS 267 (1996) (finding the right to paid maternity leave, coupled with job 
security, accelerated the return to work for Norwegian and Swedish mothers). 
254 See, e.g., William A. Galston, Public Morality and Public Policy: The Case of 
Children and Family Policy, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 313, 318-10 (1996) (discussing 
Clinton administration proposals to increase the per child tax credit). 
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dramatic and interventionist, they have been implemented successfully 
in countries less wealthy than ours. 255 
Some might suggest that it is incongruous to demand privacy from 
government intervention in certain aspects of family life but seek its 
intervention in other aspects. But incongruity appears only if the marital 
family is viewed as an indivisible unit. Dissecting that unit into its 
functional parts brings into sharp relief and permits examination of its 
different components. Once family life has been dissected, the question 
becomes not how one can justify treating certain aspects of the family 
differently, but instead how one can justify treating such radically 
different aspects of the family the same. Why should government 
privilege marriage as an exclusive instrument of expression (especially 
when the content of that expression is largely predetermined)? Why 
should it privilege one form of companionate relationship over others 
that may serve the same societal functions? Why should sexual and 
procreative freedom be contingent either upon one's marital or 
economic status? Why shouldn't the state do more to provide economic 
support for caretaking-the aspect of family functioning most crucial to 
its own future well-being?256 
Some modem family theorists ignore the power of current norms in 
shaping majoritarian views of and preferences for what is deemed 
"natural." With respect to the family, "natural" has come to refer to 
Westernized ideals of intimate commitment that have stamped out or 
obscured alternative family practices seen in much of the world.257 
255 See Krugman, supra note 242; Wolff, supra note 242. 
256 Arguably, one of the current benefits of marriage is that it puts in place a system of 
default rules which apply in the event of its dissolution. These default rules attempt to 
recognize that marriages frequently involve joint determinations that affect the financial 
positions of the spouses upon divorce. Couples can sometimes contract out through 
prenuptial agreements, but are generally bound by the property division systems of their 
jurisdictions. De-privileging marriage in law would require a new system-one that 
centers not on a particular status, but instead on those functions that we care about. This 
system might have broader application than the current one and is a topic for continued 
thought and discussion. 
257 In her history of marriage in the United States, Nancy Cott notes that during the 
colonial period: 
Christian common sense took for granted the rightness of monogamous 
marriage ... Learned knowledge deemed monogamy a God-given but also 
a civilized practice, a natural right that stemmed from a subterranean basis 
in natural law. Yet at that time, Christian monogamists composed a 
minority in the world ... Most of the peoples and cultures around the 
globe ... held no brief for strict monogamy. The belief systems of Asia, 
2004] Mistaking Marriage for Social Policy 371 
Those who embrace these ideals elide other possible manifestations of 
intimate relationships, lifelong and otherwise, that have the potential for 
individual realization and also fulfill the socially useful caretaking and 
support functions. 
Because of the current maelstrom surrounding the issue of gay 
marriage, it is worth noting that the Article has clear implications on 
how it should be treated. Again, there are aspects of family life whose 
boundaries the state ought to respect, and there are aspects whose 
societal importance calls for state support. Since gay families and so-
called traditional families are identical with respect to these aspects, it is 
both foolhardy and counterproductive for the state to treat gay families 
any differently. 
Majority American culture has not only rejected alternative family 
forms, it has labeled them "unnatural" and in some cases, even unlawful. 
Too much of what seems to underlie these arguments is a belief that 
lifelong marital commitment is a good and moral thing. But we must 
beware of"public morality" arguments in "public welfare" clothes. 
Put simply, the approach suggested in this Article promotes the 
public welfare. It safeguards individual liberty, advances gender 
equality, and protects the well-being of children and other dependents. 
It is not anti-marriage.258 It is pro-family. 
Africa, and Australia, of the Moslems around the Mediterranean, and the 
natives of North and South America all countenanced polygamy and other 
complex marriage practices .... 
Con, PUBLIC Vows, supra note 78, at 9-10. 
258 Eliminating public consequences of marriage would not preclude couples from 
marrying in private ceremonies. Individuals should remain free to marry, and religious 
and other organizations can define and solemnize marriages however they see fit. 
